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This  paper  w i l l  d i s c u s s  who t h i n k s  who t h i n k s  what, 
and s o  what,  from v a r i o u s  p e r s p e c t i v e s .  F i r s t ,  a  mathemat- 
i c a l  language w i l l  be  developed f o r  "A t h i n k s  B t h i n k s  A 
t h i n k s , . , "  t ype  p r o p o s i t i o n s ,  This  , w i l l  e l u c i d a t e  t h e i r  
i n t e r r e l a t i o n s  and make e x p l i c i t  some assumptions used i n  
d e a l i n g  wi th  them. I t  w i l l  begin  t o  a l l ow one t o  avoid t h e  
I 
mental  s t r a i n  a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  such p r o p o s i t i o n s ,  The n e x t  
s e c t i o n s ,  on S t r u c t u r e  and Dynamics, w i l l  d i s c u s s  s u b s t a n t i v e  
t o p i c s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  t h e  power of perce ived  e x p e c t a t i o n s  over  
t h e  i n d i v i d u a l .  The f i n a l  s e c t i o n ,  Economics, w i l l  d e a l  wi th  
A t h i n k s  B t h i n k s , . ,  r easoning  i n  formal  games. 
The r e a d e r  w i l l  n o t i c e  t h a t  t h e  mathemat ical  sec-  
t i o n s  are l i m i t e d  i n  a p p l i c a b i l i t y  by t h e i r  s p e c i a l i z e d  as-  
sumptions and vocabula ry ,  whi le  t h e  s u b s t a n t i v e  sect ions- . tend 
be e s s a y i s t i c ,  This  paper  may be c o n s i d e r e d - t o  r e p r e s e n t  t h e  
two ends  of a  b r i d g e  whose middle p a r t  ha s  n o t  y e t  been con- 
s t r u c t e d .  However, it may be i n s t r u c t i v e  t o  demonstra te  t h e  
p o s s i b i l i t y  of f o r m a l i z a t i o n  i n  what has  been one of t h e  
" s o f t e s t "  a r e a s .  i n .  saci.ology.' Th is  w i l l  perhaps  l e a d  t o  
g r e a t e r  c l a r i t y  and. t h u s . t o  g r e a t e r - r e f u t a b i l i t y  f o r  t h e  
t h e o r e t i c a l  appa ra tus . . i n  t h i s  a r e a .  
1. Sta tements  l i k e ,  - "Aut ru i  n ' e x i s t e .  qu1,aux yeux d g  Moi; 
l e  Moi n '  ex i ske . , quB  aux.. yeux d ' a u t r u i . ,  .. S i  . c o n n a l t r e  
a u t r u i  c u e s t .  a u s s i .  se regarder . ,  . che rche r  2 se p e r d r e  
dans 1' au t re . ,  :c '.est encore  s e  r e t r o u v e r ,  " (1962) have 
long s i n c e - . s e r v e d . ? t h e i r  purpose.  .. .Compare Shakespeare:  
"Proper ty  was. t h u s  appalled,/ That: t h e  s e l f  was n o t  t h e  
same; / S i n g l e  n a t u r e  ' s double .name/:Neither two no r  
one was c a l l e d . "  
An .attemp,t-..is made .:to...provkde.;.-enough.:~informal com- 
ment t o  make ... a l l  .. b u t  . the; f i n a l .  section,.;-..which>.requi res an 
e lementary  know1edge:of. game: -theory..,... access ibLe  t o  t h e  less 
mathematical r e a d e r ; .  unexplained.  t e c h n i c a l  -remarks a r e  per iph-  
era l  t o  t h e  argument. 
L e t  u s  . :or ient . :  ou r se lves . .  to..-the<:- s tudy  .:of A t h i n k s  
B t h i n k s .  . . by means- of an example. Cons ider  t h e  sequence 
of p r o p o s i t i o n s :  
1) A t h i n k s  he i s  desp i sed .  
2) B t h i n k s  A t h i n k s  he (A) i s  desp i sed .  
3)  A t h i n k s  B t h i n k s -  A t h i n k s  he: (A). . i s  ,desp ised .  
4 )  B t h i n k s  A t h i n k s  B t h i n k s  A t h i n k s  he  . ( A )  i s  desp ised .  
. 0 . 0 . . . 0 . 0 .  
("Thinks"  i s  always used . t o  mean:!'would - a s s e n t  t o  i f  g iven 
ample o p p o r t u n i t y  . t o -  r e f l e c t . " : .  Tt.:does n o t  mean, " i s  ac- 
t i v e l y  engaged i n  t h i n k i n g  about.  " e "Be l i eves"  w i l l  some- 
t i m e s  be used.: a s  . a.!synonym . f o r  " thinks,".;). .. : A s  . . w e  p rog res s  
a long  t h i s  . sequence. . the  propositions..-become s imul taneous ly  
h a r d e r  t o  unders tand.  and more unna tu ra l . i 2  S e v e r a l  q u e s t i o n s  
a r e  - r a i s e d .  
2. Maucorps and .Bassoul..(1962 ,.:p.; : 4.7) I.-speak:of an " e f f o r t  
de  gymnastique :mentale;  . X t . : . i s  :pe , rhaps . , . re la ted t o  t h e  
s t r a i n  assoc ia ted : ,wi  t h .  a s s e s s i n g  :~one~@~s~ : sub jec t ive  pro- 
b a b i l i t i e s , . .  . There. i s . - a  similar.: . ' ' jeu-.de m i r o i r s "  f o r  
t h e s e :  how..ce.r.tain.:am I of my degree . .of  - b e l i e f  f o r . .  .? 
Combinations. a r e  poss ible : ,  How. cex . ta in .  are.. you t h a t  I 
b e l i e v e  i t .  is.. .more..c.likely t han .  not: .that::you . b e l i e v e .  . . ? 
I suggesk .the... natu~e-:and consequences.. o f .  t h i s  s t r a i n  a s  
a rewarding :subj ect.:for research.,:. a-nd: . tha,t .  :i t depends 
n o t  merely:.on-.-complexity bu t - . i nvoaves  impor t an t  G e s t a l t s .  
A mathemat ica l  model.:£ o r  sub  j e c t f v e  - p r o b a b i l i t y  which 
took s t r a i n  s y s t e m a t i c a l l y  i n t o  account .would  be  i n t e r e s t i n g .  
1) Do t h e y  remain l o g i c a l L y  meaningful?  Y e s .  T h i s  
i s  b e s t  pe r ce ived  by r e w r i t i n g  t h e - p r o p o s i t i o n s  a s  f o l l o w s ,  
s o .  t h e y  do n o t  g e t '  l o n g e r  and l onge r :  
1) A t h i n k s  .he  i s  d e s p i s e d .  
2 )  B t h i n k s  "1) !' i s  t r u e .  
3 )  A t h i n k s  "2)  " i s  t r u e .  
4 )  B t h i n k s  "3)  " i s  t r u e .  
... O C O D O . O O  
2n-1) A t h i n k s  "2n-2)." i s  t r u e ,  
2n) B t h i n k s  "211-1) " i s  t r u e ,  
O . D . 0 . . . 0 . *  
Now i t  s e e m s  q u i t e  unreasonab le  t o  say,,  e , g . ,  t h a t  s t a t e m e n t s  
1 through  8 are meaningful  b u t  s t a t e m e n t s  9 and on a r e  mean- 
i n g l e s s .  I n  f a c t ,  it i s  c l e a r  t h a t  a l l  t h a t  i s  neces sa ry  t o  
prove t h a t  a l l  t h e s e  s t a t e m e n t s  a r e  meaningful  i s  t o  p o s t u l a t e :  
i f  A names a  pe r son . and  "x" i s  a  meaningfu l  p r o p o s i t i o n ,  then  
t h e  p r o p o s i t i o n ,  "A t h i n k s  "xu i s  t r u e , "  i s  meaningful .  Th is  
p o s t u l a t e  appea r s  i n d i s p u t a b l e ,  and w i l l  be  assumed through- 
o u t .  
2 )  A r e , - p r o p o s i t i o n s  f a r  a l o n g  i n  o u r  sequences  
(These w i l l  be c a l l e d  " long"  p r o p o s i t i o n s , )  e v e r  e m p i r i c a l l y  
v a l i d ?  Y e s .  A s  a r a t h e r  exagge ra t ed  example, l e t  A and B 
be  two mathemat ic ians  who have en joyed  a  long and i n t i m a t e  
p r o f e s s i o n a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p .  Our s t a t e m e n t s  a r e :  
1) A t h i n k s  2  + 2  = 4 .  
2) B t h i n k s  A t h i n k s  2  + 2 = 4 .  
C l e a r l y  t h e  whole.. . in£  i .ni{te set ..of*,-s tatements.. a r e  v a l i d .  
Indeed,  t h e r e  . i s ,  .a- .name... £.or. t h i . s  : s-i.tuat,i.on:. . : .:The b e l i e f  t h a t  
2 + 2 =.  4 i s  s a i d r t o .  be . shared ;  o r  . tak.en.. .for q r a n t e d  between 
them, o r  a  m a t t e r  of.common opin ion  ..... Common op in ion  w i l l  be  
d i scus sed  e x t e n s i v e l y  below, 
3)  Given - t h e  answers t o  1). and .2)., why a r e  long 
p r o p o s i t i o n s  s o  r a r e l y . u s e d ?  I donl..t  r e a l l y  know. Among 
t h e  reasons  a r e  probably a)  t h e i r  d i f f i c u . l t y ,  b)  t h a t  i n  
p r a c t i c e  t hey  may be impl ied  by o t h e r  k inds  of p r o p o s i t i o n s ,  
and c )  t h a t  i n fo rma t ion  about  them may be d i f f i c u l t  t o  o b t a i n .  
(Th i s  i s  p a r t l y  f o r  normative and p r a c t i c a l  r ea sons ,  such a s  
r e g u l a t e  ask ing  q u e s t i o n s  l i k e ,  "What do  you r e a l l y  t h i n k  
about  me?") F i n a l l y , ,  i n fo rma t ion  about  long p r o p o s i t i o n s  
may be of l i t t l e  p r a c t i c a l  use .  But t h e  example i n  t h e  f i n a l  
s e c t i o n  of t h i s  paper  shows t h a t  a  l aw  of d imin ish ing  r e t u r n s  
does  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  ho ld .  3  
3 .  Thomas J, Scheff  (1967, p. 3.7) adduces. t h e  image of t h e  
d e t a i l s  . in .  t h e .  e n d l e s s  cha in  .of :  - r e f l e c t i o n s  i n  two 
opposing .mi r ro r s .  . coa l e sc ing  i n t o .  -a.  fo rmless  b l u r  and 
sugges t s  t h a t  . e m p i r i c a l  i n s t a n c e s  .of what I c a l l  common 
opin ion  might be  ha rd  t o  f i n d ,  On t h e  c o n t r a r y ,  long 
p r o p o s i t i o n s  w h i c h . a r e  b e l i e v e d . b u t  a r e  n o t  common op in ion  
( o r  a r e  n o t  thought.  . to be,  e t c . . )  , should  be r a r e ;  common 
opin ion ,  i t s e l f  .,. -is. ,very  common. 
. . .IT .- . Language . . . , . . . . . .
Basic:Termi-nolosy :.--The o b j e c t s  o f .  b e l i e f  are - pro- 
p o s i t i o n s ,  which w i l l :  .be.  .considered-:as::de.termined by Engl i sh  
s e n t e n c e s  .' . P r o p o s i t i o n s :  ...f orm a  Boolean . a l g e b r a .  This  means 
t h a t  i f  x  and .y  s t a n d  . f o r  any ,two .propos, i . t ions:  "x  and y" 
( w r i t t e n  xA y )  , ."x. o r .  y  o r .  both" ( w r i t t e n  - x  U y):, and not-x 
( w r i t t e n  x) a r e  a l s o .  p r o p o s i t i o n s ,  and.."andl' ; " o r " ,  and "not"  
obey t h e  u s u a l  r u l e s .  Two l o g i c a l l y  - e q u i v a l e n t  p r o p o s i t i o n s  
w i l l  be cons ide red  the . s ame  ( w r i t t e n  3). SO, f o r  example, 
we have xfi y = y..n x.,, which imp l i e s  . t h a t  .."Jack i s  t a l l  and 
J i l l  i s  s m a l l , " .  means.!:the same a s  "iJi11 i s  - sma l l .  and Jack i s  
t a l l .  " 
There i s  a  . f i n i t e  s e t  of "person o p e r a t o r s " ,  A1f 
A , . . . , A , B f C . . . f .  f u n c t i o n s  wh ich . t r ans fo rm p r o p o s i t i o n s  i n t o  
( u s u a l l y  o t h e r ) ,  p r o p o s i t i o n s ,  A w i l l ;  a l s o  be used a s  a  
g e n e r i c  ( v a r i a b l e )  person ope ra to r .  .."Ax1' means "Person A 
t h i n k s  kt i s  t r u e  . ( a t  a  g iven  t ime) . " 5  I f  x i s  a p r o p o s i t i o n  
AX is. a l so :  This ,  is .  .a. . r e s t a t e m e n t . - o f . ' t h e  meaningfulness ' p b s t u l a t e  
i n  t h e  I n t r o d u c t i o n .  
. . 1 
Note. . tha t .  a. s impl i fy ing- . : - idea l iza t ion .  a l r e a d y  has  
been made. To i l l u s t r a t e  t h i s ,  d e f i n e  a , =  "The sun r o s e  today." 
1 
and b  = "The sun. r o s e  today and t h e  . t e n t h  d i g i t  of p i  i s  3 . "  
I 
4 .  Logic w i l l  a lways ,be  s a c r i f i c e d  t o  p e r s p i c u i t y  i n  t h e  u se  
of q u o t a t i o n  marks. 
5, U s e  of t h e  same symbols f o r  bo th  persons  and person  oper- 
a t o r s  should  n o t  cause  confusion.  , . " E p i s t e m i c  o p e r a t o r s "  
i s  a good name  for t a l l  t h e  o p e r a t o r s  t h a t  can be  genera ted  
from person  o p e r a t o r s  by t h e  methods d e s c r i b e d  below. 
These are l o g i c a l l y  e q u i v a l e n t  (say., -.in terms. of a v e r i f i -  
a b i l i t y  c r i t e r i o n )  so. a = b. Then Aa = Ab-, . implying t h a t  
anyone. who b e l i e v e s ,  one. . o f : . t he se  propos&ti .ons.  :must b e l i e v e  
t h e  other--absurd: . ..Thris, d i s t o r t i o n : - i s .  .al lowed. i n  t h e  . b e l i e f  
t h a t  a c t o r s 6  problems i n .  l o g i c a l  r ea son ing  u s u a l l y  can be . 
ignored  i n  t h e  a n a l y s i s  of s o c i a l  i n t e r a c t i o n .  Rather ,  op in ions  
va ry  mainly because of d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  d a t a  and perhaps  i n  
i n d u c t i o n .  So t h e  e f f e c t  of t h e  assumption t h a t  everyone i s  
l o g i c a l  (and s o  must know a l l  l o g i c a 1 , f a c t s  l i k e  t h o s e  about 
dec imals  i n  p i )  should no t . o rd ina r i1 .y  be  s e r i o u s .  6  
R a t i o n a l i t y  .Laws. --Let t.: be.athe unique l o g i c a l l y  
t r u e  p r o p o s i t i o n  and f = to R a t i o n a l i t y  ( c o n s i s t e n c y )  
6. Two k inds  of i d e a l i z a t i o n  a r e  r e p r e s e n t e d  by t h e  s t a t emen t s ,  
"The average man i n  5 '9"  t a l l , "  and "The average family  
has  2,8 c h i l d r e n ,  I' The p r e s e n t x  model i s  of t h e  l a t t e r  
k ind  and must be  app l i ed  wi th  due , c a u t i o n - - i t ,  s o  t o  
speak,  i g  n  o re s ,  a i r  r e s i s t a n c e .  
The c r i t i c i s m . ,  "Men . a r e  n o t  computers., .and t h u s  models 
t h a t  t r e a t  them : a s  . r ;a ts ional  . a re .  .he - lp less  t o  approach t h e  
more i n t e r e s t i n g  .phenomena i n  : . thei r  - l i v e s , ' '  i s  n o t  only  
f a l s e  b u t  shallow:. - .'!For s o c i a l  :contro. l .  i s  .more homogeneous, 
more cons i s t en . t ,  .from: .person to2  person:, than  i n d i v i d u a l ,  
r a t i o n a l  control : ;  . . .  I t  pe rmi t s  a-:smooth..predictability i n  
t h e  a f f a i r s  .of::men.;." ( S l a t e r ,  -1963, :p . . .  3,46-; t h i s  i s  an 
e x c e l l e n t  d i scuss ion . i  ) People.. . try . to:reason about  what 
( A  t h i n k s  .B. . . th inksp - i n  s t rugg . les .  f o r  :power, t r i a n g l e s  of 
l ove ,  and i n  :comedies. and t r a g e d 5 e s  d ! g  .Two..ma j o r  e m p i r i c a l  
s t u d i e s  have . d e a l t .  wi th  t roub led .  mar r i ages  (Laing -- e t  al., 
1966) and t h e  .awareness .of .dying : . ( .Glaser and S t r a u s s ,  1965) 
r e s p e c t i v e l y .  Of . course ; .  i n  . " c r i s e s  .of  .awarenessu people  
do n o t  s e l f - consc ious ly  use  mathemat ica l  reasoning ,  b u t  
n e i t h e r  .do  . they.  . s e l f - c o n s c i o u s ~ l y ~ - u s e .  .Eucl idean geometry 
i n  g e t t i n g  around. 
requi rements  a r e  formula.ted a s  laws : f o r  person o p e r a t o r s .  7 
( 3 )  ~ ( x t l y )  = A X ~ A Y  
For  example,.  t h e -  t h i r d .  one .  r e a d s  : .::.. '.A. b e l i e v e s  x  
and y t  means t h e  same a s .  ' A  b e l i e v e s ,  x: and- A b e l i e v e s  y  . ' 
Not ice  t h a t  "or". cannot  be s u b s t i t u t e d -  fo r , .  "and". The f i r s t  
and second i d e a l i z e .  t h e  a c t o r s  as ones f o r  .whom it i s  
l o g i c a l l y  imposs ib le  - t o - . be  mi.staken abou t  l o g i c .  
Wri te  5 f o r  " l o g i c a l l y  implies;.":, W e  now d e r i v e  
some theorems from t h e  laws. 
( a )  : Ax s .A x. I f  A b e l i e v e s  x then A cannot  
b e l i e v e  not-x,  S ince  ( a )  is .a statemenkr.of . l o g i c a l  t r u t h  i t  
i s  b e l i e v e d  by a l l  . the  a c t o r s ,  accord ing  - t o  law (1) . The -
p r o o f s  of most of t h e  theorems are: i n  t h e  Appendix. 
7 .  No a t t e m p t . h a s . b e e n  made ..to be . . exhaus t ive  i n  l i s t i n g  
t h e s e  laws -and: t h e  ones:. g iven  ia ter . : .  . For example : "For 
some x, Ax #. x , "  , i s  a. r a t h e r  . t r i v i a l -  law independent  of 
t hose  s t a t e d  he re .  
Hin t ikka  (1962)has  a r e l a t e d  b u t  much more complex set  
of r u l e s .  Mine a r e  j u s t  compl ica ted  enough t o  d e r i v e  
i n t e r e s t i n g  theorems about  combinat ions  of person o p e r a t o r s ,  
The r e a d e r  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  s u b t l e t i e s  of .  t h e  r e l e v a n t  
epis temology on t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  l e v e l ,  i s  r e f e r r e d  t o  h i s  
book. 
Could paradoxes a r i s e  s i n c e  no p r o p o s i t i o n s  a r e  excluded 
from c o n s i d e r a t i o n ,  even p r o p o s i t i o n s  -which. r e f e r  t o  t h e  
language i t s e l f ?  - I r a t h e r  t h i n k  no t .  Mathematical  
paradoxes should  be avoided because t h e  Boolean a l g e b r a  
i s  on ly  countab le .  C r i t e r i a  of meaningfulness  e x t e r n a l  
t o  t h e  model a r e  assumed-- thisJshould o b v i a t e  semant ic  
paradoxes.  For example, "This  s en t ence  i s  f a l s e , "  i s  
excluded as n o t  be ing  o r  r e p r e s e n t i n g  a  p r o p o s i t i o n .  
8 
( b )  .: AxA A (x+.y) 6 Ay. 
( c )  .: A.(x.+ y):.:.~: (Ax +Ay) . 
(d )  : .(x7c y )  .. 5 (Ax 6 Ay) ., 
( e ) :  AxUAy 5 A ( x U y ) .  
The r e a d e r  may.. wish::to .transla&e~.~~these~.theorems. i n t o  o rd ina ry  
Eng l i sh  and . -ve r i fy  them: i n t u i t i v e l y  . 
. . .  SeLf -know.ledg.e, --The--3 ol~1owing:~se- l f  -knowledge l a w s  han- 
d 1 e b e l i e f s -  about.  one:' s..own be.l.iefs;. .. Complete self-knowledge 
i s  assumed: 
( 4 ) :  AAx = Ax 
- 
( 5 )  : A Ax = Ax 
( 4 )  i s  t r a n s l a t a b l e . :  - w h a t  A b e l i e v e s  he b e l i e v e s  i s  by def-  
i n i t i o n  coex tens ive  with*-what.  he b e l i e v e s .  
The fo l lowing  are among the, more i n k e r e s t i n g  con- 
sequences:  
( f ) :  . A  Ax = AX 
8. x* y is ,  read;, :.: .'.'xE.:. x., .+hen. .y-; ? I . .  or:.. " ~ r :  on.ly:,- .i,f,. y , " o r  " x 
imp l i e s .  y,. " : Z t - .  means:that ik. :  i:s- fa;lse.- t h a t  x .  i s  t r u e  .. b u t  
y i s  f a l s e  .. . . This ;  - isy. a211 it. m e a n ~ : : . ~ : . ~ t h e r e .  ne d be no 
e s p e c i a l  connec t ion ,be tween  x and y. 
I t  i s  easy:.to confuse .  5 and;.+ : . . . .  i,t i s  any hel.p, t hey  
, . a r e  re la ted: :  as.: a r e  . = . ,and. 69.- , ;.- the!: s i g n .  . . for  " i f  and - .... only  i f " .  ) x,+y. is.. formal-ly.. def ined. . 'as .  x /p y ; . x  5 y i s  . 
de f ined .  as .  ob ta : in ing .  when (x+y.), . =: .t.. . .. Whenever x 4  y , 
x +  y i s  a:lways t rue . ,  :but .  no t .  necess7ari.l.y,. conve r se ly .  
x s y i s  i t s e l 5  . a .  .p~.oposi . t ion, ,  . whose..+va.lid.i.ty (un- l ike  t h a t  
of x+y)  . does.. no t -  depend on ,wh.ich: .p.art icular  p r o p o s i t i o n s  
happen t o  b e .  true;: : So ( x s  y ) ' .= .  t. o r .  ( x g  y )  = f , and 
( x  = y)  = .A ( x  %. y)  =::..B [A ( x  4 y)  ] .,. eke.. - .Knowledge of t h e  
language i s .  never:,in. q u e s t i o n .  ,among ,ac&ors.; (The r e a d e r  
may test.. his .-  understanding. .  by, .aer : i f  y ing  t h a t  ( x + y )  + 
(Ax+Ay) may be .  f a l s e .  . Cf. theorem (d),). . 
I n  a sense.,  w e .  have,. a .  three-va. lued l o g i c .  . - F o r  any x, A can 
be1iev.e x, can.  be l i eve .  .not-x,: or t  can be.l , ieve n e i t h e r .  A more 
e + @ o r a t e  language.: might systematica~1~1y.- .use t a t emen t s  l i k e  
A x ,  meaning:. A;believes a t  t i m e  t t h a t  x has  . p r o b a b i l i t y  
g r e a t e r  . t h a n  p. 
( h )  : A(Ax3.x) = t. 9 
Of course.,  Ax may be t.rue, whi.le. x i s  f a l s e . .  C o n t r a s t  
t h e  laws f o r  "A knows x ,  " meaning  AX^ x ,  .i. e. ,. A b e l i e v e s  x 
and x i s  t r u e  .(not , .  -neces sa r i - l y ,  ."A. b e l i e v e s  .. x.. because x i s  
t r u e .  I t )  . I f .  I .  is  the .  i d e n k i t y  . ope.rator:. def. ined.  by I x  = x,  
and i f  t h e  i n t e r s e c t i o n  ( M f l  N)x of two operakors  M and N i s  
d e f i n e d  a s  Mx/) Nx, t hen  t h e  "A knows" opera , to r  i s  A 0  I .  
A/ )  I s a t i s f i e s .  l a w s .  -(.l.) .,. ( 2 )  , (-3.)., . (41)-.,.,but n o t  (5 )  : a person 
need n o t  know t h a t  he d o e s n ' t  know whak he- d o e s n ' t  know. 10 
Opinions. o f .  .o.thers ' opinions..  --"A t h i n k s  B t h i n k s  
x , "  means "A t h i n k s  t h a t  ' B  t h i n k s  x., ' i s  t r u e ,  " and e q u a l s  
t 
' A(Bx),  AB, t h e  composi t ion of t h e  person  o p e r a t o r s  A and B ,  
may be d e f i n e d  by (AB) x = A (Bx) ; t h e  p a r e n t h e s e s  may be 
i 
removed. So AB t r a n s l a t e s  "A t h i n k s  B t h i n k s " ;  s i m i l a r l y ,  
A f l  B t r a n s l a t e s  ,"A' and B t h ink . "  Now a r b i t r a r i l y  long 
l 'polynomials" of person  o p e r a t o r s  and t h e  i d e n t i t y  o p e r a t o r  
2 
may be formed. E.g. ,  (AB) 0 ABC means "A t h i n k s  B t h i n k s  A 
t h i n k s  B t h i n k s  and,. a l s o ,  A t h i n k s  B t h i n k s  . C  t h i n k s . "  These 
. ... 
polynomials . s a t i s f y . .  laws.. '-(1) , ( 2 )  .and..::(3.) . . (b.u n o t ,  - i n  g e n e r a l ,  
( 4 )  and (5) ) ' .  and t h e r e f  o r e  theorems .. -(a,) through (e)  . They 
9. (h )  shows .... that , : .p.erson o p e r a t o r s .  :are.. noat: i n v e r t i b l e ,  and 
t h a t  t h e r e  .. are .. s.tatements-: that::. a . . i rakiona. l : .bel iever  f i s t  
bk l i eve . ,  even::' thoilgh:.: they,- may be.. ern&.ir.i ca:i ly d i scon£ i  rmab le  . 
~ e j . m u s t ,  be : l i eve . . , tha t .  h i s  b e l i e f s ,  a r e . . t r u e .  (Cf . Hin t ikka ,  
19'6.2.. ) 
10. Th$ o p e r a t o r . .  I could  b e  read  ,,... !'God.. knows ;? of cou r se ,  it 
s a t i s f i e s -  (19 ;.-(2:) .,. (3,) , ( 4 )  :, :;(53 . . The:.,l.aws f o r  person 
opeTators .  .. have.:. i n k e r e s t i n g .  anarlogs.' i n .  kopology and l o g i c .  
Thus, ~ f l ' I . ' i s .  an i n t e r i o r .  ope ra to f !  .(c.f:. ~ i k o r s k i ,  1964, 
p. ' 19 8)  and ,,'.. i f  . the. .pos t u l a t e .  Ax& x:. - ( u s e f u l  a t  t i m e s )  were 
added,  A .woudd .be.. a  u n i v e r s a l .  q u a n t i f i e r .  ..(Halmos, 1962, 
' p. 22, w i t h  the :  m i s p r i n t  i n .  h i s f  .(Q.'2-) c o r r e c t e d .  ) 
a l s o  s a t i s f y  t h e  d i s . t r ibu t ivea :  l a w s , :  . ..lL.(M 0 - N r )  ., =: LM /) LN and 
( L n M ) N  = L N . ~  MN,. ;... .But....remembe.r.-AB f BA. 
The empiric.a.l.i..li-.te.ra.tuLre;7. goes:~:~.up.i~ to.:. about-  t h e  f o u r t h  
"degree ,  " w i t h .  Maucorps - and ~as sou .1 . .  e : l i c i t i n g  .responses l i k e ,  
.\ .'\ 
" Je c r o i s  que. ..tu penses:. q.ue.. - j e  penset. q;ue t u :  t ' a t . t ends  a  e t r e  
c h o i s i  .....p ar moi, "..-(1962..,..:.p: .48.) ,.:or La.ing;-.et - a. l . .asking -(.1966, 
p, 57)  :, "How would. she-  . think - y,ou:,:have;- answered t h e  fo l lowing?  
. , 
1. s h e  l o v e s  me..,! 
Common opinion;-- Suppose Ax and ( t a k i n g  t h e  r o l e  
of t h e  o t h e r )  A b e l i e v e s  - t h a t  B i s  i n  t h e  s a m e ,  c o g n i t i v e  pos i -  
t i o n  as A himself  (say*,  because t h e i r  expe r i ences  w i th  x  and 
w i t h  each  o t h e r  were symmetr ical ) . .  A b e l i e v e s ,  t h a t  i s ,  t h a t  
i f  S  i s  a polynomial  formed from A and B ,  and S '  i s  t h e  poly- 
nomial  o b t a i n e d  from t h e  exp res s ion  f o r  S  by in t e r chang ing  
A and B ,  t hen  Sx and S ' x  a r e  t r u e  o r  f a l s e  t o g e t h e r .  Now, 
A b e l i e v e s  ''Ax is.: t r u e ,  I!. and,-,A- t h i n k s  t h i s  symmetry e x i s t s ,  
s o  A t h i n k s  Bx. A is aware t h a t  h e .  ( A ) ,  t h i n k s  Bx, s o  he 
could  use  symmetry a g a i n  t o  g e t  A(BAx) , and s o  on. I t  t u r n s  
o u t  t h a t  A t h i n k s  . that -  x  i s  a  m a t t e r  of common. op in ion  (Co) 
between A and .B  o r  . ,  symbol ica l ly :  . A C O ~ , ~ . ~ . .  . Perce ived  
s y k e t r y  , then., i s ,  one: bas . i s  fo r .  .common opin ion .  
Another approach to:cornmon-: optinion,. w i 1 . l  a l s o  be 
i n t r o d u c e d  by .  an. exarnp:le:, c. Suppose . .A  .:and.. B . a re  i n  face- to - face  
c o n t a c t  and h e a r .  from. a . .voice  whose a u t h o r i t y .  i s  n o t  i n  
q u e s t i o n ,  "You bo th  be l ieve , .  x:ll:.- .Now-. A.:and B ,  a s  w e l l  a s  
b e l i e v i n g  x, bo th .  be . l ieve t h a t  bo th  .be.lieve..  i t ,  both b e l i e v e  
t h a t  bo th  b e l i e v e  , t h a t  both  b e l i e v e  .ilt;,.. etc : .  , and x becomes 
common opin ion  . . Another- -way~.to.. . look ,.. a t ; ; t h i s .  .- r i s  : coA, Bx i s  
. : ..... :;. 
. . 
t h e  most prominent.  solu. t ion. .  to: the.: !'equat&on!.; . "A and B 
I 
b e l i e v e  x  and t h i s  s ta tement ;  !'., The. mathemat-ical. f o r m a l i z a t i o n  
of t h i s  type  of t h i n g  must -be. more d i f f i c u l t  t h a n ,  be£ o r e ,  due 
t o  t h e  SO-to-speak. inf i n k t e .  ..operations;,.:.. :(The.. less mathemat ical  
r e a d e r  should sk ip .  t o .  the:  nex t  . subsec t ion .  ) 
I t  seems des i r ab3e  t o  assume a  s t r o n g e r  v e r s i o n  of 
l a w  ( 3 )  f o r  p e r s o n .  o p e r a t o r s :  
n 
!I x  
( 3 ' )  I f  ;,, i e x i s t s ,  t h e n  / ) A x i 7 e x i s t s , , a n d  .A Axi = A n x i .  
#to- w t r  LCP 
( 3  9 reduces.  t o  ( 3 ) .  when. g- is  f i n i t e ,  
Theorem (i) : I f  &i) , M ,  N s a t i s f y  -1) , 2 )  and 3  I )  s o  does 
/ n L i ,  i f  meaningful ,  and s o  does MN. Also t h e  d i s t r i b u t i v e  
I 
l a w s :  ( / I L . ) M . =  1 . / I ( L . M )  1 and M (  AL:) = n (mi) hold when- 
1 
e v e r  /) Li i s  de f ined .  
I f  " A  and B - b e l i e v e  x  and t h i s  s t a t e m e n t , "  does denote  
a p r o p o s i t i o n , <  t h e  p r o p o s i t i o n  ought t o  s a t i s f y  y  = (AAB) (xny) . 
T h i s ,  however, l a c k s  a  unique s o l u t i o n  (y  = f  i s  a  s o l u t i o n . )  
But t h e r e  i s  a .  g r e a t e s t  s o l u t i o n  ( w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  p a r t i a l  
o r d e r  of t h e  Boolean a lgebra) ,  whose r ea sonab lenes s  i s  
suppor ted  by t h e  f a c t  t h a t  it 1s t h u s  a  s o l u t i o n  wi th  maximal 
l i k e l i h o o d  of being t r u e .  
00 
Theorem ( j) : I f  y  5. v  AM^, M s a t i s f i e s  ( 3 ' )  and . / IM~v  i s  
f i  i .. . i = O  0 d e f i n e d ,  t h e n .  y..= . M-. v i s  t h e  g rea t e . s t . . . so lu t ion  . ( M  = I by 
i = O  
d e f i n i t i o n .  ) 
There seems no reason.  n o t  t o  p o s t u l a t e :  
Applying ( j )  t o -  t h e  previous-  d i s c u s s i o n  with-:v = ( A ~ B )  x ,
B 
i 
M = A ~ B ,  we o b t a i n  Cp = (AAB), n--.jus.t .what A and 
A,  B i=l 
B would l e a r n  from .the a u t h o r i t a t i v e  ::voice above. 
Proper t ies . - ,o f  rrshared: awareness:. --We have' f o rma l ly  
d e f i n e d  Co and .Ck:: (common knowledge:;::. om. .true.:common opin ion)  
and w e  proceed t o  d e l i n e a t e  some of t h e i r  p r o p e r t i e s .  For  
example, common: -opinion:  is::what. everybody: +hi-nks i s  common 
knowledge o r ,  e q u i v a l e n t l y ,  .what i t a i s  :common knowledge t h a t  
everybody t h i n k s .  This  i s  p a r t  of theorem ( k ) :  
co = C ~ P  = P C ~  = COP = . P C O ,  ck = C O ~ I  = c ~ ( P ~ - I )  = ( P / ) I ) c ~ ,  
where P i s  t h e  i . n t e r s e c t i o n  o f -  t h e  person o p e r a t o r s  involved  
("Everybody thinks!')..:. , Co .and.-Ck. e a c h , . s a t . i s f y  .laws 1) , 2) , 
3 '  ) ( s t r o n g e r  than  3 )  .. and 4 )  , b u t  n o t  5) .; . The most i n t e r e s t i n g  
2 
r e s u l t  is  perhaps  t h a t  Co = Co. I f  someth~ing i s  common 
opin ion  it i s  common opin ion  t h a t .  i t s  i s  common opin ion .  E.g.,  
n o t  only  i s  it Co .... tha . t :  f  l a t - e a r t h e  rs  a r e  c-rackpots  b u t  it 
i s  co t h a t  everybody. . b e l i e v e s  t h i s . .  - . . .  Co-.and- Ck s h a r e  t h i s  
"idempotence" p r o p e r t y  .(law ( 4 )  ) with  p e r s o n  o p e r a t o r s  b u t  
n o t  w i th  i n t e r s e c t . i o n s :  .. and compos~ikions 05:. person  o p e r a t o r s .  
P u b l i c  opinion., ,then,,. a c t s - .  i n  a. spec i a l . .  way. l i k e  an.  i n d i v i d u a l  
consc iousness ,  ... and-.. c a n .  be.. considered.  as.; .a:!generalized Other .  
ba .. . 
10a,  I f  S is.. a .po lynomia l .  in: .person :.oper.ators3, .. 1=0 probab1.y: always.:meaningfu.l. a s  we!l.l:;.. buh sometimes hard 
t o  in te rprek . .  : .  Is t h e r e  a . , scenar io .where . . ;Sx i s  t r u e  i f  
and on ly  i f  . : S  =- Q+ (ABC) f o r  someA.w - 3  Sys temat ic  
p o s t u l a t e s .  Sor . t h e  meaningfu*lness-. o f *  v a r i o u s  p r o p o s i t i o n s  
about  symmetry.. wousld probably be. d e s i r a b l e .  
W e  conclude, t h i s  s e c t i o n  ..by . ind.ica.ti.ng.:.two- phenomena 
t h a t  may a r i s e .  w h e ~ e . .  more..-thani:..two:..persons~.are..~invol.ved. F i r s t ,
. - , . . . . . . . 
n r i  n it i s  p o s s i b l e  . t o  . ... have- .. - ( ~ h ~  . . ... -B 0 :kg,, C. .: -;,,A ,.c . , ckA , B , c , )x -- 
I "' 
suppose B and C a re . . a ' .quar re l ing  coup1e:who have.seach s e c r e t l y  
con f ided  t o  A the .  t o p i c - o f , . t h e i r  q u a r r e l .  
Second., suppose.  D. :lea-rns.;.y ,,; te.l.-1s.. E ,  . E t e l l s  t h i s  
( i n c l u d i n g  t h e  conversait ion.  w i t h .  D)::: toi. F.,---F . te. l .1~ a l l  t h i s  
back t o  D, D t a l k s  t o - E  aga in  and t e l l s  a l l  a th i s .  W e  have 
CkDt ECkF, DCkE ,FCkD, Ey. S i n c e  t h e r e  . is. always something new 
w e .  .never g e t  t o .  t h e  ... s topp ing  p l a c e  pf. Ck D';E,F* . : But i n s t e a d ,  
suppose E t e l l s  D,  t r u t h f u l l y ,  about.  y and t h a t  he  w i l l  t e l l  
a l l  t o  F, Then. ( . a f t e r  s u f f i c i e n t . t i m e .  .has e l apsed )  
Ck . ( .y f l . z )  .,.... i s . . - s a t i s f  i ed .  ..by.:. what i.s:;..known, and t h e  
= C k ~ , ~  E , F  
maximal s o l u t i o n  i s  .CkDiEIFy.. .. . So i n  !. t h i s . .  f a s h i o n  t r i a d s  
. . .  
w i t h  p a i r w i s e  communication can ach ieve*  common knowledge. 
. . .  . . 111. S t r u c t u r e  
I n  t h e  p rev ious  s e c t i o n  a language was developed 
f o r  who knows who knows what. Now.the language can be used 
t o  formal ly  d i s c u s s  , t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of knowledge w i t h i n  a  
c u l t u r e .  
One might beg in  a  taxonomy with.. ."common sense" ,  
d e f i n e d  h e r e  a s  t h a t  which i s  common op in ion  between t y p i c a l  
s t r a n g e r s  i n  a  c u l t u r e ,  o r  among everyone who i s  a  f u l l  
p a r t i c i p a n t  . i n  t h e  c u l t u r e :  C s  = Co 
. . A #A',.*.* . Probably, 1 2  
assumed common sense . . t ends  t o  be o n t o g e n e t i c a l l y  and phylo- 
g e n e t i c a l l y  p r i o r  t o . s e l f - c o n s c i o u s l y  . p r i v a t e  op in ion ,  a s  
awareness .precedes . . :  se.1-5-awareness. 
I n  t h e  .mathemat ical  .model 1 o g . i c a l .  t a u t o l o g i e s  a r e  
a u t o m a t i c a l l y  .assumed p a r t  of common- sense ; .  more g e n e r a l l y ,  
r u l e s  of language: may.. be :assumed so:..: Also t h e r e  i s  .a range 
of n a t u r a l  sc ience .  f a c t s  which a r e  common s e n s e ,  e .g . ,  "The 
e a r t h  i s  round." . .The example i s  one which it i s  common 
knowledge was once n o t  common s e n s e i . a n d  s o  has  a c e r t a i n  
prominence which..mo.s.t examples of common, s ense  l ack .  There 
i s - u s u a l l y  no p o i n t  i n  communicating common sense ,  and one 
may l a c k  self-consci .ous ..awareness o f - - , i t ,  -as t h e  i n v i s i b l e  
obvious.  I n  f ack  .,... u.tte.r.ance of . common:. s ense  . p r o p o s i t i o n s  
i s  o f t e n  a s s o c i a t e d  ..with . impropr i e ty ,  s i n c e  it t ends  i m -  
p l i c i t l y  b u t  p o i n t e d l y  t o  b r i n g  i n t o  focus  t h e  r e l a t i o n  be- 
tween t h e  speake r s ,  ... During t h e  " I n i t i a l  C a l i b r a t i o n "  phase 
of an encounte r ,  ,when.- t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  a r e  ' t un ing  i n  ' on 
each  other1'. t h e i n t e r p e r s o n a l  ~ r e ~ l a t i o n . . m u s t  b e  handled;  i t  
s e e m s  r e q u i r e d  t h e n  . t ha t  propositkons. ,  i f  t hey  be.  u t t e r e d  a t  
a l l ,  be common sense--presumably, t o  l e a v e  t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  
f r e e  t o  c o n c e n t r a t e  on t h e  s i t u a t i o n .  Even h e r e  t h e  b l a t a n t l y  
obvious ,  l i k e  the .  :F : i j i an  g r e e t i n g ,  "You:. a r e  .awake, ", (Pa r sons ,  
1914) i s  improper u n l e s s  extremely conven t iona l ,  " I t n  s 
thunder ing ,"  as cha t , .  about  t h e  weather; : .might e l i c i t  a  response 
l i k e ,  " I ' m  n o t  d e a f , "  
Common sense .may a l s o . b e  a p p r o p r i a t e  du r ing  
p s y c h i a t r i c  examinat ions  . ( i n d i c a t i v e  05 .why it i s  u s u a l l y  
1 2  i n a p p r o p r i a t e  o the rwi se ) .  Even h e r e  t h e r e  i s  a  p l a c e  f o r  
t a c t .  The taboo,.aga,ins.t-.expressing-common s e n s e  i s  dys-- 
f u n c t i o n a l  f o r  s .c ience : b u t  .cont.inues . t o .  i n f l u e n c e  s c i e n t i s t s  . 
It  i s  only  p a r t l y  .c.ircumvented by t h e  . u s e  :-of mathemat ical  o r  
s t y l i s t i c  adornment.,.. o r .  by i l l u s t r a t i o n  wi th  d a t a  n o t  g e n e r a l l y  
a v a i l a b l e ,  ~ G r h a p s  t h i s  p a r t l y  e x p l a i n s  why common s e n s e  
i t s e l f  ha s  n o t  receiv.ed t h e  s tudy  it d e s e r v e s ,  
A f a s c i n a t i n g  r eg ion  o f -  common s e n s e  i s  what 
everybody i s  expected-:fo:know about  h,imself:.- Th-is i s  an i m -  
p o r t a n t  a s p e c t  of the : .  cul&ureJ  s - - d e f i n i t i o n  of t h e  r o l e  of 
t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ,  Define A*x, "A knows about  x ,  I' a s  ( A  4 I) x  
u A T h e n . l e t  u s  say t h a t  a  f u n c t i o n  x . ( A i )  from 
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i n d i v i d u a l s  t o  p r o p o s i t i o n s  i s  "b iog raph ica l "  i f :  
11. See Pit.tenge.r., ..e:t . a l .  , ( 1960) . --
12. ' I .  . .he .may be. -q.iven . ;. , ;questions. .  t o  . a s c e r t a i n  i f  he  
can g i v e  t h e  da t e s . . o f  .well-known e v e n t s ,  " ( L u r i a ,  1966, 
'p, 310.) 
An example of a biograph. ica1 funct.ion:-~s - " A ' s  .n-ame i s  John,"  
f o r  it i s  C s  t h a t  everybody knows whe.ther o r  n o t  h i s  own 
name is  John, l3 Biographica l  funct- ions  g e n e r a l l y  s e e m  t o  
r e f e r  t o  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  h i s t o r y  -of placement. i n  s o c i a l  
c a t e g o r i e s :  e m  g. ,. s e x ,  .mili; . tary. serv . ice .  r eco rd ,  number of 
c h i l d r e n ,  b u t  t h e r e  :are a  number. o f .  i n t e r e s . t i n g  t y p e s  of 
d ivergence  from t h e  demographic i t e m s ,  .on a  q u e s t i o n n a i r e .  
There i s  knowledge con t ingen t  on r e l a t i o n s h i p ' s ,  e . g . ,  " w i f e ' s  
eye c o l o r ,  " and t h a t  which i s  p r i v a t e  - i n  v a r i o u s  s enses :  
age a t  f i r s t  c o i t u s ,  or. p resence  o f . t ookhaahe .  A% biography 
might be  de f ined  a s  t h e  s e t  o f - t r u e  x . . ( A ) .  Goffman (1963) 
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has  v i v i d l y  d e s c r i b e d  t h e  problems e n t a i l e d  by d e v i a n t  
b iog raph ie s .  
In t imacy of i n t e r p e r s o n a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  i s  measured 
by deg ree  of common knowledge of b iog raph ie s .  Acquaintances 
t end  t o  know only t h o s e  p a r t s  of each,  o t h e r s '  b iog raph ie s  
which it  i s  common s e n s e  a r e  n o t  secret1!-except sometimes 
when t h e i r  encounte r  i s  understood as fLeeti .ng.  For  c l o s e r  
r e l a t i o n s h i p s  t h e r e  a r e  p r e s c r i p t i v e  norms f o r  b i o g r a p h i c a l  
knowledge--eogo, of t h e  p h y s i c a l  l o c a t i o n  of c l o s e  k i n ,  
More s p e c i a l i z e d  r o l e s  t h a n  t h a t .  of i n d i v i d u a l  a r e  
a l s o  a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  f i e l d s  of knowledge. .The.char isma of 
e x p e r t i s e  i s  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  Durkheimian,s.acredness of t h e  
i n d i v i d u a l  i n  a n . o r g a n i c  society;in t h a t  everyone ( i f  n o t  
13, The p r o p o s i t i o n s , A  knows about  form a  Boolean a l g e b r a ,  
as do t h e  b i o g r a p h i c a l  f u n c t i o n s .  
1 4 .  Cf. Simmel, (1964) ;  I am d i f f u s e l y  i ndeb ted  t o  Simmel 
w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  both con ten t  and method. 
d e f i n e d  as s i c k )  : is. ,,t he .. e x p e r t  on.. h i m s e l f .  
A s  Plato.:envisaged.;. . the: ~~1:og.i~ca.l1~:~ sSbr . aa t i f~ i ca t ion  f 
knowledge is:. linked.:wi.th.. socia%:::.s~ra.t.i.E.ica;ti.on.,. a l though  i n  
a s u b t l e  a n d .  complex.. manner; - .  Ver.tical::..(:log-ical: i m p l i c a t i o n )  
r e l a t i o n s  among . p r o p o s i t i o n s  - a r e  .much~more~ :~~nu l t i d imens iona l  
t h a n  t h o s e  among persons.,:  -.An: i n t e r m e d i a t e  o rde r . - . i s  provided 
by what might. be  .; c a l l e d -  !' common.- know~ledge~:~.kmp~l.i.cation" , o r  
c k i  : "x ck i :  y!'..~obtains... when-..i..t. is:; common. knowledge t h a t  one - -
who knows abou t... x; ... ails.0. knows about  .y:..:: ck.i.:.allows one t o  - 
draw f a r  more. ex tens ive :  conclus.ions. than:: mere:.. l o g i c  would 
j u s t i f y .  l5 Thus  the:* r e l a t i o n  i s b a s i c - :  t o  impress iqn 
management , Consider .  x.. above.. y. i f  x:.-  cki., y.. ,. . Then., e . g . i n  
s o c i o l o g y , .  knowing .the::true: .names. of:.mos t of t h e  l i t t l e  
communities t h a t . .  have .  been ... s t u d i e d .  is : :rather h igh ,  and 
a c c r e d i t i n g ,  wh i l e .  ignorance of , the.!  i d e n t i t y  of T a l c o t t  
Parsons  i s  very:.low a n d . ~ d i s c r e d i t i n g .  
. . More .generas ly . ,  , r o l e s  a r e .  : s - k r a t i d i a b l e  by know- 
l edge ,  e . g. , it.. is: common-.-sense.. t h a t .  aa-~doctor:-!~knows about  
what a medical . .  technician..:knows -abou&,:;. -:En ,formal organ- 
i z a t i o n s ,  though,.. . it .:is.. of.t.en . suf ,5ic ient . . th*at , . :  t h e  super-  
o r d i n a t e  merely .:know. .what-% t h e -  subord5naize.;-,.knows about .  
S t r a t i f i e d - .  - knowl-edge,.:.can.-also .be .  ;that:.&: . o t h e r  members 
of  - a group --... one.:can..:define. - the  i n s i d e r ,  
15. Compare and.:.contrast:. t h e . .  '!-logic;". .. u s e d . n . b a 1 a n c e  theo ry ,  
a s  i n  Abelson,. and Rosenberg:.;(.l95 8.). 2 - cki:. is  a quas i -  
o r d e r ,  
t h e  g o s s i p ,  e t c .  
For  . ~irnp.l-i:c:i,ty.._.~.I.. have.;.b,een-. . ta.lki.ng. .o5,-.-common s e n s e  
r a t h e r  than,..of.. ,pe~.c.ei.ve.d:. .common: :-sense:..:: ;... Of.;,.cou.u.rse-;~;,.the c o n t n t  
of t h i s  c u l t u r a l  appa ra tus  : v a r i e s  among'- : individuals,  l i k e  
t h e  i d i o l e c t s  .of  . a  language. I t h i n k  the Eorms a r e  more con- 
s t a n t  t han  the .  .content--and- t h a t  ...thi:s.. i s ,  i t s e l f ,  a m a t t e r  
of common sense ,  . enab:lLng.. empa.thy somewhat..- t o  t r anscend  
c u l t u r a l  b a r r i e r s .  
. . . . . . . . I Dynamics 
How d o e s  knowledge -.change:.:over.:.time ?. A r e  t h e r e  
e q u i l i b r i a  i n  the.distribution-.of..know-ledge .and, i f  s o ,  how 
a r e  they mainta ined? , .  These are. .what,* .I--.would- c.al.1 dynamic 
q u e s t i o n s .  
Acquisi.ti.on.. of knowledge.. --New knowledge can be 
acqu i r ed  by p e r c e p t i o n ,  V i s i o n . i s - . p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n t e r e s t i n g  
because of t h i s  common s e n s e  proper ty : -  i f  B sees A look a t  
B ,  t hen  A s e e s  B look ) a t  A,  From t h i s  and . a  few s imp le r  
p r o p e r t i e s  one..  can .demons t ra te  t h a t  eye. .  c .on tac t  l e a d s  t o  
common knowledge. .of~.tkie p resence  o f . t h e  . i n t e r a c t a n t s .  I t  i s  
no co inc idence  t h a t  eye - c o n t a c t  i s  of c o n s i d e r a b l e  emotional  
and normative s i g n i f i c a n c e ,  
Common knowledge always seems t o  be b u i l t  up from 
prev ious  common. .kn.ow.le.dg.e..  Suppose. w e  - ar.e ... on a  p i c n i c .  I 
know t h a t  i f  i t : . ~ s - t a r t s  r a i n i n g  t h i s , . w i l l  - b e  common knowledge 
among u s ,  For  r a i n  is .  a p u b l i c  even t .  - I t  i s  i n  t h e  c l a s s  
of e v e n t s  f o r  which it i s  and (it i s  Ck) it remains common 
knowledge t h a t  ev.ery member of a  group w i l l  know about  such 
e v e n t s  when they  happen, And it fo l lows  from theorem ( I ) ,  
Ck(x+Px) = Ck(x+Ck x ) ,  t h a t  it i s  Ck t h a t  p u b l i c  e v e n t s  
w i l l  be Ck when they  happen. The p u b l i c  l o c a t i o n  f o r  e v e n t s  
i s  a  v i t a l  taxonomic ca t ego ry ,  a s  i l l u s t r a t e d  by i t s  u t i l i t y  
f o r  r e s e a r c h  ( c f .  Lof land,  1966) . 
Most impor t an t ,  knowledge .comes from communication. 
Normally, f a c e - t o - f a c e . u t t e r a n c e s  a r e  p u b l i c  f o r  t h e  par -  
t i c i p a n t s .  .And, normal ly ,  through communication knowledge 
becomes common. knowledge. l6 The p o s s i b l e  abnormal r ami f i c -  
a t i o n s  are ve ry  e x t e n s i v e .  When a  q u e s t i o n  i s  asked ,  even 
t a k i n g  communication channe ls  f o r  g r a n t e d ,  a l l  t h a t  may be 
c e r t a i n  i s  t h a t  t h e  q u e s t i o n e r  b e l i e v e s  it i s  i n  h i s  i n t e r e s t  
t o  ask t h e  q u e s t i o n .  For  ( r e c a l l i n g  Desca r t e s )  w e  can say  
t h a t  even i f  t h e  q u e s t i o n e r  was on ly  concerned t o  g i v e  t h a t  
impress ion ,  it would s t i l l  be i n  h i s  i n t e r e s t  t o  ask  t h e  
ques t ion .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand, t h e  q u e s t i o n e r  may know t h e  
answer a l r e a d y ,  o r  h e  may no t ,  and i f  he  knows i t  he may 
t h i n k  t h e  o t h e r  does  n o t  know he knows i t  o r  n o t ,  and i f  ..., 
e t c .  
"Abnormal" equi l ib r ia . - -Of  g r e a t e s t  i n t e r e s t  a r e  
e q u i l i b r i a  s h o r t  of t h e  ,"normal" e q u i l i b r i u m  of common 
knowledge, such a s  t h a t  of p l u r a l i s t i c  ignorance .  The 
n o t i o n  of p l u r a l i s t i c  ignorance  does n o t  un ique ly  s p e c i f y  a  
c o g n i t i v e  s i t u a t i o n ,  b u t  i n c l u d e s  c a s e s  where everybody t h i n k s  
a  g iven  way, b u t  everybody t h i n k s  everybody e l s e  t h i n k s  t h a t  
t h e  o p p o s i t e  i s  common knowledge: P X . ~  f l  A .  A .ckx.  Drinking 
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p r a c t i c e s  a r e  t h e  topic:of a  c l a s s i c  ~ s o c ~ o l o g i c a l  example. 
Using theorem (m)  : n A .  A .Ck = Ck f )  AiAj ,  we see t h a t  t h e r e  
**B * ' --9 
i~ a so-to-speak h i d d e n . b u t  r e a l  c o n s e n s u s . i n  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n  
of p l u r a l i s  t i c  ignorance- -a  consensus , a s  . t o  o t h e r ' s  expec t -  
a t i o n s  f o r  o n e s e l f .  Pa radox ica l ly ,  p l u r a l i s t i c  ignorance  i s  
16. Compare t h e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  of communication as a  p roces s  
of e q u a l i z i n g  in format ion  by Newcomb e t  a l l  (1965) and 
t h e  d e r i v a t i o n  of Co from symmetry, above. 
. . : .  
. . 
s t a b l e  because.  ..of.,. .this..-.consensus . . . .  ;E:;g .... ;r one h i d e s  one ' s 
d r i n k i n g  behavior  n o t  s o  much because. :one. th inks  o t h e r ' s  
p ' r ac t i ce s  a r e  d i f . fe ren . t .  b u t .  becausei, :one.. .I t h i n k s  o t h e r s  ' 
e x p e c t a t i o n s  f o r  one's. .own pract ice:$ .  d i f f e r  from t h e  r e a l i t y .  
For  t h e  community t o  ach ieve  consensus on d r i n k i n g ,  t h i s  
consensus on e x p e c t a t i o n s  would have t o  be t empora r i l y  
des t royed .  
Another schema f o r  e q u i l i b r i u m . s h o r t  of Ck i s  t h a t  
of t h e  shy l o v e r s .  The . f a c t  of t h e ,  l a c k  of avowal i s  common 
knowledge and has  i t s  own common sense .  i m p l i c a t i o n s ,  which 
a r e :  Ck [ (a Ab) /I (5 U E )  1 where a .= !A l o v e s  B" and b = "B 
l o v e s  A".  (Note t h a t  who and whether one loves  i s  more o r  
less a p a r t  of one" biography.)  A .might s o l i l o q u i z e :  "She 
has  s a i d  no th ing  because she  doesn-' . t  l ove  me, o r  i f  n o t  s o ,  
i t  must be because. she  doesns  t r e a l i z e  , I  love  h e r .  But t h a t  
would show she  l a c k s  i n t u i t i v e  unders tanding  of me." 
The p r e s s u r e  of expecta t ions . - -The e x t e n t  of 
i r r a t i o n a l  avoidance of p o t e n t i a l l y  d i s c r e d i t i n g  s i t u a t i o n s  
l i k e  t h o s e  d i s c u s s e d  above i s  probably  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  a 
g r e a t  d e a l  of p r i v a t e  s u f f e r i n g ,  s o c i a l  conformity  and p o l i t i c a l  
a l i e n a t i o n .  I t  c r i e s .  f o r  exp lana t ion .  Whence t h e  myster ious  
power of consensus ( indeed ,  of s o c i e t y )  over  t h e  individual '?  
W e  w i l l  . beg in  .by examining .some c u r r e n t  t h e o r i e s .  
H e r e  it should  be  . no t ed  t h a t  t h e  f o c u s  i s  n o t  on t h e i r  
c o n s i d e r a b l e  h e u r i s t i c  u s e f u l n e s s  b u t . o n  t h e i r  c a u s a l  v a l i d i t y .  
Then a d i f f e r e n t  t h e o r y  w i l l  be p r e s e n t e d .  
The usual .contemporary e x p l a n a t i o n  i s  ego-psychological  
and runs  something l i k e  t h i s  : i n d i v i d u a l s .  -need an adequate  
se l f - image i n  o r d e r  t o  f u n c t i o n ,  bu t .  mus t . . va l ida t e  t h e i r  
s e l f - concep t  through o t h e r s .  Thus . t hey  a r e  extremely s e n s i t i v e  
t o  t h e  t h r e a t  of be ing  l a b e l l e d  unworthy--as i s  shown by t h e i r  
egos  ' t h i c k  padd-ing i n  r i t u a l s .  of - d e f e r e n c e  and p a t t e r n s  of 
defense .  l7 One d i f f i c u l t y  wi th  t h i s  hypo thes i s  i s  t h a t  it 
s e e m s  t o  i nadequa te ly  account  f o r  t h e  s p e c i a l  r o l e  of consensus 
(common knowledge of agreement) i n ~ s o c i a l  p r e s s u r e .  This  
c r i t i c i s m  does  n o t  apply t o  S c h e f f l - s  (1967, p. 36) sugges t ion :  
"The c o l l e c t i v e  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s  a r e  f e l t  a s  power- 
f u l  e x t e r i o r  c o n s t r a i n t s  because each i n d i v i d u a l  
ag rees ,  recognizes  t h a t  h i s ,  ne ighbors  ag ree ,  . . . and 
s o  on i n d e f i n i t e l y ,  Although he ag rees  ( o r  
d i s a g r e e s )  w i th  t h e  s en t imen t ,  i t  i s  a l s o  something 
beyond h i s  power t o  change, o r  even complete ly  
exp lo re ,  The p o t e n t i a l l y  e n d l e s s  m i r r o r  r e f l e c t i o n s  
of each , o f .  t h e  o t h e r s u  r e c o g n i t i o n s  i s  f e l t  as 
something. u t t e r l y  f i na l . ,  , From t h i s  fo rmula t ion  it 
fo l lows  t h a t  each a c t o r  f e e l s  t h e  presence  of t h e  
c o l l e c t i v e  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n .  w i t h  a  s ense  of e x t e r i o r -  
i t y  and c o n s t r a i n t ,  . , . " 
~ c h e f f  seems t o  imply t h a t  c o l l e c t i v e ,  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s  have 
t h e i r  power because t h e  p r o p o s i t i o n s  . involved  a r e  s o  manifold 
and complex. But , t h e  i m p l i c i t  psychology- of awe be£ o r e  t h e  
i n f i n i t e  i s  -- ad hoc,  A c h i l l e s  w i l l  b e a t  t h e  t o r t o i s e  i n  
s p i t e  of Zeno's r e f l e c t i o n s ,  
I t  i s  i n s t r u c t i v e  t o  compare Durkheim's (1951, p. 
307) t r e a t m e n t  of . c o l l e c t i v e  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s  i n  Book 111, Ch. 1 
17. Lof l and ,  (1966) -prov ides  an e x c e l l e n t  e x p o s i t i o n  of such 
a model : i n  a  : s e c t i o n  e n t i t l e d  ,The . .Frag i le  Nature of Man. 
of '  S u i c i d e :  
"Usua l ly  when c o l l e c t i v e  tendenc ies .  o r  p a s s i o n s  
a r e  spoken o f ,  w e  tend,  t o  .regard; . t he se  exp res s ions  
a s  m e r e  metaphors and- manners of,- speech wi th  no 
r e a l  s i g n i f i c a t i o n  b u t  a sort---of average among a 
c e r t a i n  number of i n d i v i d u a l  s t a t e s .  They a r e  n o t  
cons ide red  a s  t h i n g s ,  f o r c e s  s u i  g e n e r i s  which 
dominate t h e  consciousness  of s i n g l e  i n d i v i d u a l s .  
None t h e  less, t h i s  i s  t h e i r  n a t u r e ,  a s  i s  
b r i l l i a n t l y 5  shown by s t a t i s t i c s  of s u i c i d e .  The 
i n d i v i d u a l s  making up a s o c i e t y  change from y e a r  
t o  y e a r  y e t  t h e  number of s u i c i d e s  i s  t h e  same s o  
long a s  t h e  s o c i e t y  i t s e l f  does  n o t  change." 
Unfor tuna te ly  , Durkheim d i d  n o t  unders tand  t h e .  meaning of 
s t a t i s t i c a l  r e g u l a r i t y .  He d i d  n o t  r e a l i z e  t h e  profound 
s i g n i f i c a n c e  of  t h e  s m a l l  b u t  d e f i n i t e  amount of i r r e g u l a r i t y  
t h a t  would remai-n i n .  h i s  d a t a  i f  soc i a .1  v a r i a b l e s  (and 
r e p o r t i n g  e r r o r s )  were c o n t r o l l e d  f o r .  For  suppose t h a t  2 
v a l u e s  t hen  came o u t  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  lower t han  would be 
expected by chance. .  .,.Durkheim would be  l i t e r a l l y  c o r r e c t  and 
ou r  concept ion  of t h e  n a t u r e  of s o c i e t y  would be  profoundly 
d i f f e r e n t  from w h a t , i t  i s .  Then it would indeed  be u s e f u l  
t o  conceive of a s o c i a l  s u i c i d e  quoka and a sup rape r sona l  
e n t i t y  r e s p o n s i b l e  . . f o r .  t h a t  quota .  
Durkheim cons t ruc t ed  an un tenab le  soc io logy  t o  account  
f o r  what s e e m s .  t o .  be, the.. power of s o c i a l  f o r c e s .  But forms 
of t h e  c o l l e c t i v e  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s  .concept .have remained use- 
f u l  enough ( f o r  q u a l i t a t i v e  data, t h o u g h )  t h a t  psychology has 
been d i s t o r t e d  . t o . p r e s e r v e  it. S o c i e t y  s t i l l  dominates t h e  
i n d i v i d u a l ,  b u t . n o t  because s o c i e t y -  i s -  s t r o n g  b u t  because t h e  
i n d i v i d u a l  i s  weak. 
Both t h e  contemporary. hypotheses .  t h a t  have been 
p r e s e n t e d  overemphasi.ze. t h e  -.role-*.-of:.- cogni  tive:. an t eceden t s  i n  
a c t i o n .  Western c u l t u r e  and2.:his,tor:ica-l.l--and co temporary. 
soc io logy  are r i f e  . .with..  myths about: t h i s  :: : H a m l e t ' s ,  r e s o l u t i o n  
w a s  supposed t o .  b e .  s i c k l i e d  o ' e r  by t h e  p a l e  c a s t  of thought ,  
b u t  t h e r e  i s  a. widespread.  b e l i e f  t h a t  be- l i e f  i n  f r e e - w i l l  i s  
neces sa ry  n o t  to . .be , .para lyzed .  (Compare. t h e  e a r l i e r  b e l i e f  
t h a t  be  l i e f  i n  God. - is  . .necessary. .-not .  t o . d o  .evi.L. ) " I n  every 
h i g h e r  k ind  of p roduc t ion-  a person needs t o  unders tand  and 
b e l i e v e  i n  h i m s e l f , "  (Cooley, 1956, p; 2241,; c f .  Simmel's 
II 
(1964', p. 310) d i s c u s s i o n  - o f  t h e :  Lebensluge-. . The c e n t r a l i t y  
of e x p e c t a t i o n s  i n  contemporary a c t i o n ,  t heo ry  i s  c o n s i s t e n t  
w i t h  t h i s ,  p a t t e r n .  ( v i d e  Parsons ,  1964, Ch. I)  . Most of t h i s  -
i s  t h e  u l t i m a t e  r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n - - t h a t  t h e r e  i s  any reason  -
( c f .  Ryle, 1949) . I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  i n d i v i d u a l s  may r a t i o n a l i z e  
t h a t  t hey  conform because they f e a r  what o t h e r s  w i l l  t h i n k  
( D i s c r e d i t i n g  r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n s  a r e  s a f e s t  from c h a l l e n g s )  , 
b u t  t h e r e  may be only  ,a c o r r e l a t i o n . .  And s e n s i t i v i t y ,  r e a l  o r  
o g t e n s i b l e ,  t o  o t h e r s '  op in ions  does n o t  mean t h a t  a funda- 
\ 
m e n t a l  need is ,  involved .  A p r o p o s -  t o  t h e  f i r s t  hypo thes i s  
d i scus , sed ,  t h e r e  a re : . . soc io log ica l  - reasons: , for ,  t r e a t i n g  people  
a6 having s e n s i t i v e ,  egos-, whether. they: have-  them o r  n o t .  18 
18. There i s  perhaps;  something- .l.ike. a n a t u r a l  l a w ,  r e s u l t i n g  
f r o m  interperson~a~l.icomparisons . o f .  u t i l i t y ,  t h a t  worth 
as an e t h i c a l : - o b j e c t .  i s -  p r o p o r t i o n a l .  t o  range  and s e n s i -  
t i v i t y  of feelings, . , . .  . (v ide  -AndersenRs . -  (.1835) s i m u l a t i o n  
of status-vaiidation..ceremonies:. ).. : A t  any rate,  t h i s  law 
has  some v a l i d i t y :  i n -  t h i s  cn l tu re~ , - - and -  we w i l l  d i s t o r t  
t h e  f e e l i n g s  i , f . . neces sa ry  to.  match-. t h e -  a s c r i b e d  wor.th. 
~ h u s  t h e  n e u r o t i c  w i l l  be  denied.  range and t h e  p s y c h o t i c  
o r  c r i m i n a l :  w i l l .  be, denied:  s e n s i t i v i t y - ;  A person  would 
wish t o  be  :almost  any th ing  but.. a c l o d ,  e x c e p t  a vege tab l e .  
So it i s  no ivonder. . that  defe rence .  r i t u a l s  t r e a t  people  
a s  i f  s e n s i t i v e . . a n d .  i n t e n s e .  
A fou r th .  .hypo.thesis is. s~gges.ted..~.b:y. . .c .Linical  d a t a .  
. . 
Ana lys i s  w i l i  c e n t e r  on:: the .  dyad--an: a l r e , a d y  complex l e v e l .  19 
I see no reason.  . to b e l i e v e -  . t h a t  the.-:s.oci.al::einhibi t i o n s  of 
n e u r o t i c s  i n  t h e . r a p y : d i f f e r  impor t an t ly -  from those  of average 
persons  except  in.:degree (and n o t -  even wi th -  r e s p e c t  t o  degree  
i n  t h e  middle s t ages .  of s u c c e s s f u l  t he rapy) ;  So by examining 
what seems t o  h e l p  t h e s e  people  w e  may o b t a i n  i n s i g h t s  on 
t h e  n a t u r e  of s o c i a l i z a t i o n .  There is good evidence t h a t  
t he rapy  can be e f f e c t e d  by r e c i p r o c a l  i n h i b i t i o n  of a n x i e t y  
responses  t o  d i f f i c u l t  s o c i a l  s i t u a t i o n s .  This  i s  done by 
r e p e a t e d l y  encouraging a s s e r t i v e  responses  t o  s u b j e c t i v e l y  
ve ry  mild forms of t h e  a v e r s i v e  s t i m u l i .  ( S a l t e r  (1961):  
Wolpe and Lazarus ( 19 66) ) . This  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  t h e  appa ren t  
power of c o l l e c t i v e  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s  i s  due t o  cond i t i oned  
a n x i e t y  responses  t o  t h e ,  a s s o c i a t e d  b e h a v i o r a l  s t i m u l i  r a t h e r  
t han  t o  something more i n t r i n s i c .  What accounts  f o r  t h e  
e x i s t e n c e  and s t a b i l i t y  of t h e s e  responses?  
Le t  m e  s k e t c h  t h e  hypothes i scby  means of a  s c e n a r i o .  
Suppose Ego a sks  a  q u e s t i o n  which he f e a r s  may be r a t h e r  
s i l l y  t o  A l t e r  who i s  e x p l a i n i n g  something t o  him. Much t h a t  
i s  more conc re t e  t h a n  Ego 's  be ing  " r ede f ined"  may happen. 
A l t e r ' s  r e a c t i o n  may d i s c o m f i t  him~.by- confirmi.ng h i s  f e a r s  ; 
it w i l l  b e ,  li teral-ly:, bad- news, and t h e r e f  o r e  produce an 
19. My impress ion i s  t h a t  t h e  presence, .of  an audience t ends  
t o  ampli fy  t h e  c r u c i a 3  p o s i t i v e  feedback e f f e c t s  hypo- 
t hes i zed .  This  i s  g e n e r a l l y .  t r u e  i n  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  
s i t u a t i o n s  d i scussed .  I n  them, f u r t h e r ,  t h e r e  may be 
Ck t h a t  one a c t o r  e represen ts  s o c i e t y ' s  e x p e c t a t i o n s .  
emotional  r e a c t i o n . .  I n  t h i s  c u l t u r e  he . .wi l l .have, - the  problem 
of managing t h e  . e x p ~ r e s s l o n  of affect :  superimposed on h i s  i n t e r -  
a c t i o n a l  task--under p e n a l t y  o f  be ing  perce ived  as ( H e r e ,  
r a t h e r  t han  d i r e c t l y , ,  t h e  t h r e a t  of "unworthiness"  s e e m s  t o  
come most i n t o  p l ay . )  i n a p p r o p r i a t e l y  demeaned. A s  t h e  f low 
of i n t e r a c t i o n : .  is d i s r u p t e d ,  - A l t e r .  w i . l . 1  tend.  t o  be  f r u s t r a t e d  
and i n d i c a t e  resentment. .  toward Ego.-wh,ich w i l l  f u r t h e r  f l u s t e r  
him, e t c .  20 . During.  t h i s  p e r i o d :  of read jus tment  unp leasan t  
u n c e r t a i n t y  about.  p r o p o s i t i o n a l -  polynomials .  f u r t h e r .  he igh tens  
t h e  t ens ion .  Thus, i n  a  word, embarassment i s  u n p l e a s a n t ,  
and e x p e c t a t i o n s  a r e  conformed t o ,  though n o t  s o  much because 
of a  f e a r  o f .  be ing  thought  unworthy.::as-because of a .  cond i t i oned  
and perhaps  unconsc~i.ous . ave r s ion  t o  :-!.'.losing one ' s cool"  . 
The argument g iven  does n o t  s e e m - * s u f f i c i e n t . t o  account  
f o r  t h e  i n t e n s i t y  o r  t e n a c i t y  of a v e r s k o n . t o  p o t e n t i a l l y  
embarassing s i t u a t i o n s .  Here I t h i n k -  t h a t  f a c t o r s  m i l i t a t i n g  
a g a i n s t  t h e  e x t i n c t i o n  of-..-soci.al-: i n h i b i t i o n s  a r e  c r u c i a l - -  
p a r t i c u l a r l y ,  t h e  u b i q u i t y  i n  s o c i a l  i n t e r a c t i o n  of t h e  
p o s i t i v e  feedback i n d i c a t e d  above. . I n  t h e  p r g c i s  of behavior  
t he rapy ,  t h e  s u b j e c t i v e  extreme mildness  of t h e  a v e r s i v e  
s t i m u l u s  w a s  c r u c i a l .  With inan imate  o b j e c t s  one can come, 
l i t e r a l l y  o r  f i g u r a t i v e l y ,  a  few inches  c l o s e r  each  t i m e  
u n t i l  a l l  f e a r  has.  van lshed ,  never  .being exposed t o  even 
moderate di8comf ort: .  . .:When it-. i s  a .  m a t k e r  of human r e l a t i o n -  .. - 
2 0 .  Cf. Goffman (1961) on " f lood ing  o u t " ,  a  r e l a t e d  t y p e  of 
contagion.  
s h i p s  something l i k e - . - . t h i s - . i s  much more.:. d i f  f i c u l t - - f o r  i t  i s  
ha rd  t o  make them.-vary;;gradually-.. a n d .  con t inuous ly  .- - The i n t e r -  
a c t i v e .  ad jus tment  ... of. . r e c i p r o c a l  -expectati.on.s-,: t h a t  occurs  
whenever some.thing:.:happens .. suggests: ;that-;. a.: .r .elat.ionship w i l l  
n o t  pos ses s  even .tempor:ary..:s t a b i l i t y :  -except .  a t  a  d i s c r e t e  
se t  of e q u i l i b r i u m  ...p osi.t.ions.: I .- .beiIieve : s tud i e s  of t h e  pro- 
c e s s e s  of courtship..and,.divorce- s u p p o r t  t h i s ,  
. .. . . Objec t ive , .  d i s c u s s i o n -  o f  t h e . ;  r e 2 a t i o n s h i p  might 
s o l v e  t h i s  s t a b i l i z a t i o n . .  . problem.. but .  o f t e n  t ends  t o  d e f e a t  
i t s  purpose.  A.ls.o:, t h e r e .  . .are norms --in:.:this s o c i e t y  a g a i n s t  
d i s c u s s i n g  r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  .(primary- o r : .  secondary)  . With most 
people  unused;. t o ;  .d is .cuss ing. .  mask. r e l a t i o n s h i p s :  . t h e i r  f i r s t  
a t t e m p t s  would.. be  ..likeSy- - t o  - be: -emb-arrassimg.. . A l l  t h i s  t ends  
t o  ma in t a in  t h e  . s t a t u s  quo. 
Aspects:  of :.:.the. soc i~ology  -.o£.s.exu-al.- .impotence form 
a  s i m p l i f i e d  paradigm::-f o r  ... t h e  d i s c u s s i o n  :(.embarrassment, 
p o s i t i v e  f  ee.dback.,. :discontinuity.).~.~.:?..W. i s  s i m p l i f i e d  because 
t h e  aommon sense - : l i nk  .between aff .ect . .and.  behavior  i s  t i g h t e r  
t han  i n  c a s e s  more t y p i c a l  of s o c i a l  a c t i o n . )  One type  of 
t he rapy  i n v o l v e s  a. p a r t n e r  wi th  ful-1 knowledge of i t  and use  
of d e l i b e r a t e  r e s t r a i n t  i n  o r d e r  twmove g r a d u a l l y  t o  f u l l  
s e x u a l  a c t i v i t y .  (Wolpe and Lazarus,  1966) '. This  \ i l l u s t r a t e s  
what I mean by g r a d u a l  cont inuous v a r i a t i o n  and t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  
i n  a r r ang ing  t h i s .  Imagine an -a t tempt  t o  d i r e c t l y  adopt  t h i s  
t echnique  t o  ex t inguish- .  i n h i b i t i o n . . a g a i n s t  a sk ing  one s boss  
f o r  a r a i s e !  
To summa-rize,: t h e  e n d l e s s  .mi r ro r s  of m u t u a l .  
e x p e c t a t i o n s  amplify..b,y. pos-i:k.ive-. feedback:,.::.the emotions 
a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  .unconvenAt.ional-.:. in te . rac t ion . , .  and g ive .  t h e  f i e l d  
of i n t e r a c t i o n  p a t t e r n s  a c h a r a c t e r  of .  d i s c o n t i n u i t y o  This  
d i s c o n t i n u i t y  makes everyday l i f e .  unab le  t o  e x t i n g u i s h  t h e  
a v e r s i v e  c o n d i t i o n i n g  con t ingen t  on. t h e -  d i ~ r u p ~ i o n - o f  consensus. 
Q u e s t i o n s  remain unasked; knowledge. remains unshared,  and t h e  
s t a t u s  quo i s  mainta ined.  
To t e s t  t h i s  t h e o r y  it w i l $ l .  b e  neces sa ry  t o  make 
it more e1aborate:and p r e c i s e .  Because of t h e  s p e c i a l  prom- 
inence  i t  g i v e s  t o  c u l t u r a l  r e g u l a t i o n  of  a f f e c t i v e  behavior ,  
c r o s s - c u l t u r a l  i n q u i r y  should be u s e f u l  - i n  d i f f e r e n t i a l l y  
e v a l u a t i n g  it. 
The Ostensible.--One more t o p i c  must be  a l l uded  to :  
mutual  p r e t e n s e , . o r  the 'open  s e c r e t :  t h e r e  i s  common knowledge 
b u t  t a c i t  c o l l u s i o n  to a c t  as i f  t h e  c o n t r a r y  of t h e  p r o p o s i t i o n  
w e r e  t rue--e.  g.. , a s . : - i f .  t h e  - p  at ient . . .were;  nok dy ing-  - ( G l a s e r  and 
S t r a u s s ,  1965) . I t  then i s  common knowledge t h a t  it o s t e n s i b l y  
i s  common knowledge t h a t  t h e  pa t ien t1  i s  n o t  dying.  When a  
p r o p o s i t i o n  i s  o s t e n s i b l y  v a l i d  it means. t h a t  i n t e r a c t i o n  i s  
c a r r i e d  on as i f  t h a t  . p r o p o s i t i o n  w e r e  t r u e .  I t  i s ,  of cou r se ,  
common s e n s e  t h a t  t h e r e -  i s  a  t y , p i c a l  r e l a t i o n  of correspondence 
between r e c i p r o c a l  .knowledge p a t t e r n s -  and i n t e r a c t i o n  p a t t e r n s .  
SO-  i n t e r a c t i o n  p a t t e r n s ;  c a n  be  c l a s s i : f$ed -  :-and s t r u c t u r e d  by 
means of t h e  know.ledge. p a t t e r n s -  i n -  t y p i c a l -  correspondence,  
I ' 
whether  o r  n o t  t h i s -  knowledge a c t u a l l y  o b t a i n s ,  Ground-rules 
£ o r  i n t e r a c t i o n  a r e  desc r ibed  .by o s t e n s i b l e  p r o p o s i t i o n s .  
I 
 his c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n  s u g g e s t s -  t h e .  r e s e a r c h  t a s k s  of desc r ib -  
i ng  t h e  s t r u c t u r e s  :.. of.-. os:tensib~le~.:wor-l.ds.~: .  and .... compa.ring them 
with common sense: worlds.,:; and- :.both.. wikhr. .the....real world. 
Typically. ,  - os tens ib ly :  everything; :.is: . .  f.o.rl ..the...b.est, i n  t h e  b e s t  
of a l l  p o s s i b l e  worlds. 2 1  
... . 
21.  Hence .. I' coo.l.i,ngi.rout:" .procedures;. are: :possible.  See 
B i  t t n e r ;  4.1-9 63)  . :.on:::how: po2ice:. ap.prehend.- t h e  mentally 
ill .for  : iP&ust ra t ion .  
W e  re tu rn :  .. to: :.a,..formaL. perspecti-ve-..:.. .Knowledge can 
be t r a n s l a t e d  . . into: .  rat-.kona.l-:- act- ion.  through.  :the--. more o r  l e s s  
. 
copmon s e n s e  princ. ip: le: .  o f .  maxixnizkng. . expec ted  u t i l i t y  . 
Game theo ry  s t u d i e s L  s i t u a t i o n s  where t h e  u t i l i t i e s  of 
multip,le :. . decision-makers: .  i n t e r l o c k ; - . , i t -  has- been assumed . t h a t  
, . . . .  
t h e  form of t h e  *,game. . i s  :common knowledge ,. I n  . t h i s  f i n a l  
s e c t i o n  o f  t h e  .paper .  we ana lyze  a simp.le - type of c a s e  where 
t h i s  r e s t r i c t i o n  i s  r e l a x e d .  The normative t heo ry  of t h e  
2-person O-sum game w . i l l -  be  extended t o  t h i s  c a s e ,  and an 
a lgo r i t hm f o r  so lv ing .  such generalized,-games w i l l  be de r ived  
and a p p l i e d  t o  an example. 
L e t  .two r a t i o n a l  p l a y e r s  p l ay  a game, M, whose 
payof fs  depend. on . a  paxameter v e c t o r  h-.with..given p r o b a b i l i t y  
d i s t r i b u t i o n .  M i s  O-sum f o r  each value$ of h. The d i s t r i -  
b u t i o n  of h and t h e  r a t i o n a l i t y  of t h e  p l a y e r s  i s  common 
knowledge. 
Le t  the .  p l a y e r s  be A and- B ,  and l e t  C be  a v a r i a b l e  
s t a n d i n g  f o r  e i t he r ; .  . . C  l s.;knowledge- of. .h.:may be b r i e f l y  
d e s c r i b e d  by . a  p r o p o s i t i o n  w r i t t e n  (Ch..= v)  , where 
v = ( . . i f  vi , ... . 1 . i s  t h e  v e c t o r  w i th  v . .  = 1 . i f  C knows t h e  
. . 1 
v a l u e  of component:.i: of h and v = 0, o therwise .  
. . i . 
The . ,d i s  t r i b u t . i o n  of knowledge .-in. t h i s  s i t u a t i o n  is  
g iven  by a func t ion . e (S ,C) . :  e(S,C) =. v . i f .  S(Ch = v)  i s  t r u e ,  
where S i s  formed f  som A ,  B, and 1;. b y .  composi t ion.  (The se t  
of such S w i l l  be . h e r e a f t e r  r e f  e r red . :  t o .  a s  the .  semigroup.). 
22. This  s e c t i o n . . i s .  . a  . r e v i s i o n  of Friede.11 (1966J .. 
--. 
For  i n s t a n c e ,  e  (ABA, B.) .. = .( 1,O.):. .means:. th'a.t.:A. t h i n k s  B t h i n k s  
A t h i n k s  t h a t  B knows the-  f - i r s t  component..of. h- .but  n o t  t h e  
second. 
F i n d .  r a t i o n a l ,  s t r a t e 9 i . e ~  ,and. the:: va lue  :of M, given 
e. (Some r e s t r i c t i o n .  w i l l  l a t e r  be placed: .on-  e  t o  avoid  
23 c e r t a i n  i n f i n i t e  r e g r e s s e s .  ) 
Dec i s ions .g iven  t h e  opponent ' s  decis ion.- - In  s o l v i n g  
a  game of t h e  type  g iven ,  C w i l l  judge t h e  appearance of t h e  
s i t u a t i o n  t o  D ( C ' s  opponent ) ,  c a l c u l a t e  D ' s  s t r a t e g y  on t h i s  
b a s i s ,  and a c t  accord ing ly .  Given t h a t  C b e l i e v e s  D w i l l  
choose a  s t r a t e g y  D* from a  s e t  z ,  w e  may, guided by conven- 
t i o n a l  game theo ry ,  p o s t u l a t e  a  se t .  o f  r a t i o n a l  s t r a t e g i e s ,  
m f o r  C. m may be ob ta ined  from t h e  c l a s s  of a l l  p o s s i b l e  
C '  C 
s t r a t e g i e s  f o r  C by. 1) e l i m i n a t i n g  those.wh.ich depend on 
parameters  C does  n o t  know, 2 )  e l i m i n a t i n g  those  which maximize 
expec ted  u t i l i t y  a g a i n s t  no D* i n  z,. and 3 )  e l i m i n a t i n g  those  
which do  n o t  maximize C% minimum on t h e  chance t h a t  he  may be 
wrong about  D ' s  d e c i s i o n ,  ( C  does n o t  assume he may be m i s -  
taken about  D ' s  knowledge, j u s t  as. C does  n o t  assume t h i s  i n  
conven t iona l  game theory .  ) 
m then ,  depends on e  ( C , C )  and e  ( C ,  D)  a s  w e l l  a s  
C '  
on z ,  and we may w r i t e :  ( d )  C[(Ch = x) n (Dh = y ) f )  (D*rz ) ]  
5 [C*zm ( x, y #.z) I... . (For tunate , ly ,  m t ends .  t o  have j u s t  C 
one member,) Note t h a t  t h i s  i n e q u a l i t y  t r a n s l a t e s  op in ion  (on 
t h e  l e f t  s i d e )  t o  a c t i o n  (on t h e  r i g h t  s i d e ) .  (06 )  i s  n o t  
e m p i r i c a l l y  re fu tab le - -an  apparen t  c o u n t e r i n s t a n c e  would only 
prove t h a t  t h e  r a t i o n a l i t y  cond i t i on  used h e r e  were n o t  
23. Harsanyi  (.1962) . t r e a t s  a  somewhat r e l a t e d  problem. 
s a t i s f i e d .  ~ h u s -  the.  .inequa.li:ty . (d):: .is:-.equal-?to.-. t i.n. t h e  formal  
system, and hence i s  common knowledge. 
Now w e  can f i n d  E B s  opt imal .  s t r a t e g i e s  ( E  = A o r  
E = B )  g iven  on ly  e . .and .ETC (D*Zx) f o r :  some T  i n -  t h e  semigroup. 
For  ET may be p r e f i x e d  . to  each s i d e -  of.. ..(&).. . to  o b t a i n  a  r e s u l t  
of t h e  form ET (C.* 5;. z S.:);., . and th . is . -  process-:may. be i t e r a t e d  . 
Decis ions  where t he .  opponent' .s- d e c i s i o n  i s  unknown. 
1) I f  t h e -  s i t u a t i o n  i s  a conven t iona l  game, each 
p l a y e r  knows t h e .  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of knowledge about  t h e  parameter.  
This  i s  e q u i v a l e n t  . ko . t h e  cond i t i on -  on .e: e ( I ,  C) = e (S  , C )  
f o r  a l l  C and .S... .Define .g  . a s  the.  s e t  0.f such e ,  
2 )  I t  is-. assumed, i n  accordance wi th  convent iona l  
game theo ry ,  t h a t  E (e-5 g.)& (E  ' p l ays  -maximin i n  . t h e  game 
s p e c i f i e d  by g . )  
3) It. w i l l  now be shown how . E 1 s  s t r a t e g i e s  can be 
. d e r i v e d ,  g iven  on ly  t h a t ,  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a  semigroup element T 
such t h a t  e (ET,C)  = e  (ETS,C) f o r  a l l  S  and C. 
I 
4 )  Define e = e ;  d e , f i n e t h e . f u n c t i o n  eE by: 
E WE W E  
e (S , C )  = e (ES, C); i f .  eW is  d e f i n e d ,  d e f i n e  e a s  (e ) Then 
T T 
i t  can be shown .by . i nduc t ion  t h a t .  .e . .-is.  de f ined  and e (S,  C)  = 
e(TS,C) f o r  any T and S., 
5). Wri.te .as, .$e t h e  s.tatemen>t.: "e o b t a i n s .  I' 
E E $e 5 E  ( S e  ) fo l lows  X ~ o m  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  .of  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  of e . 
S  6 )  Lemma): S e  s S ( $ e  ) f o r  any S  i n  t h e  semigroup 
(proved i n  t h e  Appendix). 
7)  Suppose . f o r  some T;:e ( T I C ) .  = e (TSIC) f o r  a l l  
T T T s .and C,  Then e g .g . --for e ( 1 , C )  = . e  (.TIC) = e (TS,C) = e  (SIC) 
8) Now suppose,  a s  i n .  3)-,..-e.(ET., c)-= e (ETS, C) . Then 
eETd g (from 7)), and E T ( $ ~ ~ ~ )  ( f rom 6).) ... I fv .T =. I ,  s u b s t i t u t e  
eE f o r  e i n  2 )  t o  ob ta in ;  t h a t -  E plays..max-imin . i n  t h e  game , 
E ET s p e c i f i e d  by e . .. I f  T = WF (F = .A .or..F,..= .B)., .  t hen  EW(F($e ) ) , 
ET so -  EW (F p l a y s  maximin, -i.n t h e  game- speci'f'i'ed by e ) . Now t h e  
d i s c u s s i o n  i n  t h e  previous .  subsect.ion. may be a p p l i e d  t o  
de te rmine  E t  s s t r a t e g i e s .  
9) I f  zA -and ;.z a r e  t h e  . .se.ts.: . in which A* and B* B ' 
a r e  f i n a l l y  determined t o  . l i e ,  t h e  v a l u e  V -of  M w i l l  s a t i s f y :  
max E P 2 V ~  min EhP, where E P i s  A " s  expected u t i l i t y .  h h 
1 0 )  A f i n a l  weak assumption,may be used t o  s i m p l i f y  
t h e  n o t a t i o n :  (Ch = x) = C(Ch = x ) .  . Then f o r  a l l  S and C,  
~ ( s c , c ) =  e (S ,C)  = e(SC);  where h e r e  e i s  newly de f ined  a s  a 
f u n c t i o n  of one v a r i a b l e  (e ( I)  i s  n o t  d e f i n e d )  . 
Some consequences.--1) Suppose A knows what B i s  
A t h ink ing :  t h a t  is,. e (AS) = e (S)  f o r  a l l  S f I. Then e = e l  
and $e.=$ A($e ) .  A. w i l l  know t h e  a c t u a l  s i t u a t i o n  and hence 
B t s  decision,. .  To know t h e  whole t r u t h ,  obviously  enough, i s  
b e s t  of a l l  f o r  a ra . t iona1  p l a y e r .  
2) . It-..is- easy  . t o  show- t h a t .  . . to :,.gain ... i n fo rma t ion  
about  t h e  parameter  does n o t  h u r t  .a-.;.,p:laye.r even when t h e  
f a c t  of t h i s  g a i n  . is  ..common knowledge: .:(.a.l.khough he may be 
d i sadvantaged  . j f  :he .does n o t .  know..that: t h e  o , ther  knows about  
h i s  new informati .on) .... .:..The ques t ion .  i s  .posed whether t h e s e  
two c o n d i t i o n s  on V a s  a.  f u n c t i o n  V(e): :of  e a r e  t h e  only  
powerful  condi.ti0n.s: , . ..th a t  .. can.. .be : demonstra ted . 
' ., 
. . An example..:-The. reade.r: .:map.:.!S.ind- . s impl-e - i Plus  t r a k i o n  




' 1 '! ;.where. prob.. ( w  =-. .O:) --.=- prob (w  = 2 )  = . 5 .  -1 
This  gaqe i s  i n t e r p s t i n g  because t h e  appanent ly  symmetr ical  
1 
.change from e c 0 t o  e s  1 g i v e  A a  d i sadvantage  (of .0 7) . X (e)  
i s  most i n t e l l i g i b l y  p r e s e n t e d  by a computat ional  diagram and 
t a b l e  : . .. e z  1 . .  e ~ l  
e (SA) = O  




e ~ 0  esO 
Legend: -\ x D.. \ - 
( P ~ , , P ~ ~ )  . , a  .. . . .  . . > (P ..-DO. - .  ,pDJ 
t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y .  t h a t .  . C , : . w i l l  choose. t h e  f  
- 
w = i. f ( P D O f P D 2 ) J . = - ~ ( ~ t ~ f C ( P C o f P C 2 ) J  
n o t  needed he re .  A node a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  
' i rsk.  row o r  column when . The v a l u e  of y  i s  
a  f u n c t i o n  e c g  i n d i c a  
an op t imal  s t r a t e g y  f o r - . t h a t  game. 
-. . . . ;. . . Values of V 
The computa t iona l  procedure  w i l l  be i n d i c a t e d  by 
an example. Suppose t h a t  knowing t h e  va lue  of w i s  "chea t ing" ,  
and suppose t h a t  i n  f a c t  no one i s  cheating. , ,  b u t  A t h i n k s  
B t h i n k s  A i s  chea t ing :because  A observes  B frowning,  and B 
t h i n k s  A t h i n k s  B i s  c h e a t i n g  because B observes  A s c r u t i n i z i n g  
him. (Ac tua l ly ,  t h e  frown and t h e  s tare a r e  r e i n f o r c i n g  
each o t h e r . )  S ince  each  t r u s t s  t h e  o t h e r ,  n e i t h e r  t h i n k s  t h e  
o t h e r  ' is  chea t ing .  I n  s h o r t ,  e  (ABA) = e (BAB) = 1, e  = 0 f o r  
o t h e r  arguments. eABABeg, s o  ABA ( B  p l a y s  maximin i n  dhe 
game s p e c i f i e d  by e r . 0 ) .  .Enter.  t h e .  t a b l e  a t  B %  e = 0  node 
t o  f i n d  ABA. (.B p l a y s  ( 5 , 5 ) Now s i n c e  e  (ABA) = 1 fol low 
- - 
t h e  " 1"  arrow t o  node a. So AB ( A p l a y s  (0.1) ) . Continuing , 
w 
A ( B  p l a y s  ( O , O ) . )  and,  f i n a l l y ,  A p lays  (0,O) . S i m i l a r l y  
w e  ob ta in :  B p l a y s .  (l., 1) . From t h e -  t a b d e i  t h e  va lue  of t h e  
game i s  -1, a w o r s t  :. outcome - f o r  A-i ::even,. khough .. the c o g n i t i v e  
s i t u a t i o n  i s  symmetric. 
A cou ld  .ge t . .  .,2 . i f  it .were ... Ck:.. t h a t -  he . a lone  knew t h e  
v a l u e  of w.  But .  A g e t s  . .h is-  maximum of I;-5. i f  he :knows w and 
can c o r r e c t l y  deduce . . .  t h a t  B w i l l  p lay- . . (0 - , l )  . . B w i l l  p l ay  
( 0 , l )  i f  it i s .  Ck . t h a t .  he .  a lone  knows w:; e x c e p t  t h a t  t (BA) = 1 
(i. e . ,  B t h i n k s -  A i s  peeking) . .. So- i f  A.  wants t o  c h e a t  most 
p r o f i t a b l y  he s h o u l d . s e l 1  B o s t e n s i b l y  e x c l u s i v e  knowledge 
of w and then  c h e a t ,  b u t  do i t  j u s t  c lums i ly  enough t h a t  B 
c a t c h e s  him b u t  does  n o t  r e a l i z e  A r e a l i z e s  t h i s .  
Conclusion.--Let us  r e t u r n  t o  t h e  q u e s t i o n  d i scussed  
i n  t h e  I n t r o d u c t i o n  o f , t h e  r a r i t y  of long p r o p o s i t i o n s .  I t  
would be  n i c e  i f  t h e r e  were a  convergence law l i k e :  f o r  any 
> 0 ,  3 n 3 j v ( e l ) -  v (e2) (<s  whenever el and e2 d i f f e r  on ly  f o r  an 
argument of t h e  form s (AB)"T. But no th ing  l i k e  t h i s  ho lds  
f o r  game G;  w e  have seen t h a t  it can be q u i t e  p r o f i t a b l e  f o r  
an  a c t o r  t o  i n d ~ c e ~ a n o t h e r  t o  b e l i e v e ,  a polynomial  p r o p o s i t i o n  
of h igh  deg ree ,  b u t  t h i s  may r e q u i r e  much a d r o i t n e s s .  Perhaps 
w e  have a  c l u e  a s  t o  t h e  common 1ack:of . independent  
s i g n i f i c a n c e  of t h e s e  p r o p o s i t i o n s .   he g e n e r a l  q u e s t i o n  
arises: i s  t h e r e  a  s t r u c t u r e  of props  n e c e s s a r y n o r  s u f f i c i e n t  
t o  induce a r ea sonab le  man t o  b e l i e v e  a g iven  such p r o p o s i t i o n ,  
and i f  so--what is  i t , ?  F ind ings  on t h i s  t o p i c  might perhaps  
be  d i r e c t l y  u s e f u l  on ly  t o  conf idence men and espionage 
agenc ie s ,  b u t  v a l u a b l e  s i d e l i g h t s  might  be  shed on t h e  
geometry and f u r n i t u r e  of t h e  s o c i a l  world.  
. . . . . ..  . .  . . A p p e n d i x  
. .  ( P r o o f s )  
T h e o r e m  ( a )  : A x  5 A; 
- - 
P r o o f :  t = f = A£ = ~ ( x n ? )  = AXOAF = A X V G  =   AX^ A;;). 
T h e o r e m  (b): A x f ) A ( x = S y )  ,L Ay 
P r o o f :  A x A A ( x + y )  = ~ ( x n  ( x * y ) )  = . A ( x ~ Y )  = A x n A y  4 AY- 
T h e o r e m  . ( d )  .: ( x  G y )  5 . ( A x  5 A y )  
P r o o f :  ( x i y )  m e a n s . ( x n y  = x ) ,  s o A x . = A ( x f l y )  = A x n A y ,  
and ( A x  g A y )  . 
T h e o r e m  ( e )  : A x  u A y  5 A ( x U  y )  
P r o o f :  x 6 x Wy, so  A x  6 A ( x  V y )  ; s i m i l a r l y ,  Ay  & A ( x U y ) .  
T h e o r e m  ( f )  : A Ax = A x  - - 
P r o o f :  A Ax = Ax = AX. 
T h e o r e m  ( g.) : A ( A x  U Ay.) = . A x  (J ~y . . 
P r o o f :  A(A-x,C)Ay:) = A ( A x C / A y )  ( f r o m - - ( . £ ) )  = ~ ( A x n A y )  = 
T h e o r e m  ( h )  : A ( A x 6 x )  = t 
Proof: .  t = Ax u A ~  = A x  (JA Ax < A(X:U-Ax)  ( f r o m  ( e l  ) = 
A ( A x + x )  5 t. 
An a s s o c i a t i v i t y  - lemma (used below) : I f  z .  = \ x  i s a d e f  i n e d  and, 
x e b ;  
J 
f o r  each j ,  x  =- A x  is  de f ined ,  t h e e .  n x.. e x i s t s  and 
j  xsT 3 3 
j  
e q u a l s  2, 
Proof:  1) z 6 x j  f o r  every  j (obvious)  , 
2 )  I f  y  S x  f o r  every j ,  then y x  f o r  every  x ;  
j  
hence y  < z .  
Thus z i s  t h e  g r e a t e s t  lower bound of t h e  x  . 
j  
Theorem ( i ) :  S a t i s f a c t i o n  of laws (11) and ( 2 )  i s  obvious.  W e  
f i r s t  show: I f  f o r  a l l  i ,  Mi s a t i s f i e s  ( 3 ' )  , and i f  /I Mi 
e x i s t s ,  t hen  0 Mi . s a t i s f i e s  ( 3 ' )  . 
1 
Proof: Assume A x k  e x i s t s .  1 
( n 1 M i  ( x )  then  e x i s t s  and e q u a l s  Q [ M ~ ~ ; !  xk] = 0 [I;I) Mi$] = 
A M x from t h e  i n £  i n i t e  a s s o c i a t i v e  law.  ( S i k o r s k i .  1964, 1.k i k b  
p. 5 9 ) .  Now we show 0 MiXk i s  t h e  g.1.b. of ( I / l n i ) x 4  = {o ( M ~ x ~ $  . I n  t h e  lemma, l e t  x  3 .la /l Mixk, z 4r\ l , k Mixk; 
t hen  ( /1 Mixk) e x i s t s  and e q u a l s  f i  M .  x  So i r k  L k '  
W e  n e x t  show: I f  MI,  M 2  s a t i s f y  ( 3 , . ) ,  t hen  M I M i  d o e s ,  
Proof :  I f  /)xi e x i s t s ,  f l  M ~ X ~  and do. Now, 
M1M2( f i x i )  = M l c  0 M2xi) = 0 M1M2xi. 
W e  f i n a l l y  t u r n  t o  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i v e  l a w s :  M (  f l  Li) = f) ML i 
i s  a  r e s t a t e m e n t  of ( 3 )  ; ( 0 L .  1 ) M  = /) (LiM) fo l lows  from 
t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  .of composit ion.  
1. I n c i d e n t a l l y ,  any countab le  Boolean a l g e b r a  i s  incomplete  
( S i k o r s k i ,  1964, p ,  66)- 
f i  i 
Theorem ( j ) :  If.M.satisfies.(3'),and-'.,z =:.i=O.. M...v i s  de f ined ,  
t hen  z is  t h e  g r e a t e s t  va . lue  - f o r  y  t h a t  s a k i s f  ie_s y  = v f i ~ y .  
A Mi.v -= f )  Mi+lv, Proof:  1) z  = , v / l ~ z  . .  F O ~ M Z . =  M . .  1=0 1 =.o 
0 Mz = n /\ Mi,.= 1=1 Miv ( f rom: the . a s soc i a< ive  l a w ) .  1 = 0  
2) z  i s :  t h e  g r e a t e s t  s o l u t i o n .  F o r  suppose w = v f l ~ w ;  
. . i i+l i i then  M w = M ~ V / ~ M  - - w I  SO M w s  M V .  w S M W ;  u s i n g  (d )  
80 
f ) . p i x . i s  d e f i n e  s o  Co =.. Theorem (k )  : . a )  . . i= 5, 
j\ pix i s  def ined .  Ck = cod1  = r\ pi/) P O  
lfl 1=1 
b) . Clear. ly,  Co = CkP, s o  (1.) ., ( 2 )  and ( 3  ' ) f o r  
Co fo l low from t h e i r .  v a l i d i t y  f o r  Ck, .which.  w i l l  be demonstrated.  
- i d )  P . . . f . =  f ,  . s o  Ck f  = f .  
Bo 
e)  Ck = pi s a t i s f i e s  (38') . Apply theorem 
.1= 0
i 
(i) w i t h  P  = Mi, 
1) Ck x 6 . x ,  so  CkCk x  5 Ck x. 
2 )  -9 (pix) . e x i s t s  and Ck s a t i s f i e s  
( 3 )  , so /T Ck (pix) e x i s t s  and e q u a l s  Ck (Q (pix) ) . - * 
i 
Ck x  CkP x  bechuse ckpix = f l  I.= 0  pJpix = /\ ]=I P I X  2 n ]=O PIX.  
- - 
Now Ck x  5 /? ckpix. = Ck /l pix = CkCk x .  So Ck x  = CkCk x. 
Formulas: . s t a r t i n g  from 1) : Ck.:=, c o  f l  I and 2 )  : - 
C o  = CkP, and apply ing  ( 3 ' )  w e  g e t  PCk = . /\ ~ = 1  = C o .  So 
C o  =-CkP = PCk . . .  ckPfl.1 = Ck, from. 1) and 2 ) .  Also,  
- 
c k ( ~ f l 1 )  = ( P ~ I ) c ~ . =  Ck, f o r  C'k = C ~ P ~ I  = c k ( c k p 0 1 )  (from 
( 4 )  ) = ~ k ~ n  .Ck. =. . P c k . n  Ck. .  = - (p .A .1 . )  C k  , ,..and .... C k ~ f l .  ~k = Ck ( P  0'1) . 
Now,  COP = . P C 0  = . C o ,  for :  
2  2  1 )  .COP := .CkP . = P C k P  = .P C k  = P C o ;  
2  
2 )  . P . .I.. P . ( s i n c e  . person.. opera;tors,.-.are . . i d e m p o t e n t )  , 
2 
S O . C o P . s . . C k P <  '5 C k P  = ' . C o , ; : C k . S . C o , -  C O ' =  C k p s  COP,  
a n d  COP = C o .  ( 4 )  . holds.. f or  C o  ( i  . e. , co2 = C o )  , 
2 2  2  
. for.: . . .  C O .  = C ~ P C ~ P  .=. C ~ C ~ P  = C ~ P  = COP = CO. 
F o r m a l  deli,nea.ti.on.-.of,.: .the:. a rgumen t : . :  . f r o m - :  s y m m e t r y  . i n -  t h e  Common 
Qpin ion  subsec,tion: a L e t  S .  d e n o t e . . a  p o l y n o m i a l  i n  A and B ,  
- -- . . 1 
and l e t  % ( S . )  e x c h a n g e 3 A  and B i n  t h e  expression f o r  Si. 
1 
H e r e  
o n l y  w e  a s s u m e :  , y = /) ( S j x + + j J ( S i )  x )  i s  m e a n i n g f u l .  S h o w  
1 
~ ( x f l y )  S ACo x. 
P r o o f :  A ( X A Y )  s ~y = ~ [ / 1  ( s i x c . . b ~ ( s i ) x ) l  = Q ~ ( s ~ x c p % ( s ~ ) x )  5 
A ( S i x f S  % ( S i )  x )  f o r  each i ( t h e o r e m  (c) ) ( A S i x  + A Q ( S i )  x )  . 
T h e  m o n o m i a l  Si m a y  be e n u m e r a t e d :  
n 
So = I - .  
' 4n -1  
= (AB) , n 3 : l  
S1 = A n , 
' 4 n + l  = .  (AB) A, n 2 0 - .. 
S2 = B 
I '4n+2 = B(AB)" ,  ~ Z O  n 
S3 = AB 
'4n+4 
= B(AE3) A, n q  -1. 
S4 = BA 
S5 = ABA 
N e x t  w e  s h o w  by i nduc t i on :  A ( x 4  y ) <  8s. x f o r  every m o n o m i a l  
1 
Si. W e  k n o w  ~ ( x n y ) ~  A s o x . J 
Suppose ~ ( x n y ) ~  ASnx. I f  n i s  even A S  x = ASn+lx. If n i s  . n 
odd: A ( x f l y ) 6  A S n x  and A ( x n y )  g ( ~ S ~ x q A g ( S ~ ) x ) ,  so  
~ ( x ~ y )  c A B ( S ~ ) X  = A S ~ + ~ X .   or, A%(S4n;l = AWAB)")  = 
A(BA) = AB (AB) n-1 - 
. - . A s 4 ( n - 1 ) + 4  and A g ( S 4 n + l  ) = ~g ( (AB) "A) = 
n n A (BA) B = AB (AB) . = -AS 4fi+.2,e Now, Ck x.= . .  . n s i x , . ,  SO ACk x = 
. . 
0 .six. S ince  w e  h a v e  shown A . ( x ~  y )  g. As:x.,.-.we -conclude:  
1 
A ( x A ~ )  s A C ~  x 5 ACO X,  
Le7mmas on epis.temi.c.. o p e r a t o r s  : . . A l l .  o p e ~ a t o r s  .used from h e r e  
on a r e  assumed t o  s a t i s f y  (5) 1 ( 2 )  .and ( 3 ' ) .  
Lemma: . I f  M C N .  and.P S Q, t hen  MP S NQ. 
Proof :  MP . N P  f rom.  t h e . . d e f i n i t i o n  of . M  f N ;  NP 5 NQ from 
P 5 Q and theorem (d)  . 
i 
Lemma: I f  M~ = M S I . M . 6  N, t h e n M s  N , i = 0 ,  1, .... 
i i 
Proof :  M = M & N i f  i: .? 1, and t h e -  r e s u l t  i s  immediate i f  
2 Lemma:. I f  M = M S . N .  5.1, then  MN:= NM = M. 
2 
P roof :  S ince  N g  I . , . M N . . g M  and N M G . M . .  M S N ,  s o  M = M 6 NM 
2 
and M = M MN. Therefore  MN = M and NM = M. 
Lemma: Ck, S CKee6' 
/? 0 A .  s o ,  from a. lemma,. the . .  k-th powers 
A, c a  Ai 5 X:r& 1 
L I 
a l s o  b e a r  t h i s . , i . nequa l i  ty.. . . Take g,.,l.. b. ! s. :..to.. prove t h e  lemma. 
The f o l l o w i n g - t h r e e  theorems j u s t i f y . i n t u i t i o n s  concerning 
o p e r a t i o n s  o n .  Ck. .operators .  
Theorem: Le t  L = ( / b C k . )  /l (/S) A j ) ;  l e t r  be t h e  s e t  of a l l  
1 .  I 
person  o p e r a t o r s  . involved;  . .  . then  kg:Lk - . e x i s t s  and e q u a l s .  Ck,. 
k 
.Proof : W e  know. .f.rom -..the..lemmas i i . Ck.;p.-.S.-L ..,- . . so  Ck,, i s  a 
lower bound of {LV :Also; - L . L ; ~ )  A j '  SO L ~ c . ( ~ \ - A . ) I ( .  -J d ' - - 3 
Theref o r e  any lower bound of  {fl i s  a - l l oye r  bouhd of 
k {( f;) A j )  3 and hence of Ckp. W e  conclude,: (ll e x i s t s  and 
e q u a l s  Ck,. 
T h e o r e m :  I f  . f o r  a l l  i,j k 
. . 
.Ms... 1 3  5 1 k a n d .  N + =  . . .k fi [ - O M . .  1 3  . ) e x i s t s ,  
l e t  L = ( M ~ ~ M ~ ~ .  . . M ~ ~ .  ) .  /) ( M ~ ~ M ~ ~ ! .  . ' M ~ ~ ~  ! .A ..:. . /9 (Mm1Mm2 . . . 
1 
. . ,  ... 
k 
Mmn ) Then A.L .exists a n d e q u a l s  N.  
m  
Proof: S u b s t i t u t i n g  I f o r  a l l  M  e x c e p t . M . .  w e  see L Mi , 
pq , 11 
so nMij. 
- 
( k f l ~ k j ) n i ~  t h e  i - t h  t e r m  i n  L; r )  % j  4 I ,  s o  ( / ) ~ k ~ )  m a x  ( n  1 . ) i 
(2 l n i  and ( / ) M ~ ~ ) ~ ~ ~ ( ~ )  i 5 L L / ) M  and ( . O M .  . )  k ( m a x ( n i )  
kktj h"kh - i j  1 3  4 k - 
L _c (I,, M i j )  N ,  t h e n ,  i s  a l o w e r  bound of f i k i ' i n d  any 
l o w e r  bound of [LkJ i s  a l o w e r  bound of N. So f l  Lk = N ,  q .  e. d.  - 
2 
.. . . 
r )  ( M A N )  e x i s t s ,  t h e n  T h e o r e m :  I f  M2 = . M I  N  = N  and . l=O 
h s b  A- A ; A  
/ 1 ( N M )  e x i s t s  and equals  N  ( $=O\ ( M  O N )  & M I  I I. 1=0  . . .  i-1 
Proof: O n e  can s h o w : . b y  i n d u c t i o n :  ( M  JI~N.) = ( N  n 1 )  k = l  A (MN) (M 4 1 )  
f )  ( M N )  i/) N M ~ N / ~ M  ( i  z 1). 
i -1 i-1 
SO, N ( M / ~ N )  2 i ~  = N k = l  0 (MN) k ~ f l  ( N M )  i+l/) N M =  k = l  A (N&. T h i s  i s  
2 i  i+l k a l so  t r u e  w h e n  i = 0 ,  and I/EN(M/IN) M = h z O  ( N M )  ( 1  Z 0 ) .  
, . 
.: i 
and 1 0 N ( M O  N )  2 i ~  .=/I N (ih N )  . k ~ .  ; T h i s  5s a l s d  t r u e  w h e n  
i+l 
k = O .  SO I / ) N ( M ~ ~ N ) ~ ~ M  = 
_ .  
k = O  ' ; I . f l N ( M  A N )  k M ) ,  and kco ( N M )  = 
8 ( I ~ ~ N ( M ~ ~ N ) ~ M ) .  
k = O  
f i  ( M / ) N ) ~ ) M ~ ~ I  F i n a l l y ,  N  ( 
= N ( M A N )  i ~ ) . n  I ( u s i n g  ( 3 ' )  ) 
- f \ w ( N ( M / ) N ) i M ~ . I )  ( S i k o r s k i ,  1 9 6 4 . p .  6 0 )  
1=0: 2; 
- fly ( 0 ( N  (MO N.) k ~ f l l J .  ) ( b y  the a s s o c i a t i v i t y  lemma) 1=oi - 
- f l  ( f l ' ( N M ;  k,  . 
1=0 k = O  
- f l  (NM)  ( b y .  . the.  i n f i n i t e  associa t ive  l a w ) .  
1=0 
i Coro l l a ry :  f i  i=l (Ck;..ECk ) : e x i s t s a n d  e q u a l s  Ck 
I E,F # .. . DIEIF 
( c f .  t h e  concluding.  paragraph. .of  ... s e c t i o n .  11) . 
Proof: Ck = , . 0 (Ck f)ckE.. F).k., . from . t h e  f i r s t  of 
D ~ E ; F  - ='O" . ; . D I E  
Qe 
( . ,, , i = t h e  t h r e e  theorems- - j u s t  proven. ->. i=O,  I F  
/)I.= CkblECk . Ck - 
C k ~ ,  E ' ~ D ,  E ,  F '~E;F 
 
. . DIEIF E.,F. C k ~ , ~ , ~  ( f r o h  t h e .  
. .  . theorem j u s t  p roved .  and a lemma) .. F i n a l l y ,  , 
Theorem (1) : Ck (x*Px) = Ck (x+k x)  . 
i i+l 
Proof:.  C ~ ( X + P X )  6 c ~ P ~ ( ~ + P ~ ) s  C ~ ( P  X ~ P  X I ,  s o  
~k (X;JPX) L ~k (x+pix) . N ~ W ,  f l  pix e x i s t s ,  s o  0 (Z v pix) 
e x i s t s  and e q u a l s  ? [ n pix) ( S i k o r s k i ,  1964, p. 60) ; 
i.e. , f i  (x=+Pix) = ( x 3 C k x ) .  U s i n g - ( 3 ' 1 ,  C k ( x j C k x )  = 1 = 0  . - 
c ,  
L ~k ( n ( x + ~ i x )  ) = f )  ~k ( x + ~ i x )  . SO ~k (x-;)Px) f~ ~k ( x + ~ i x ) =  
Ck(x=?Ck x) .   here fore, Ck (x&Px) . .=  Ck(x*Ck x) , q.e.d.  
Theorem (m) : 
Proof:  Le t  B = F i r s t  .we-.show BP = PB: 
BP = 
S 
A lemma . i n  s e c t i o n  V: $e 5 S ( $ e  ) f o r  any S i n  t h e  semigroup. 
T 
Proof :  This  i s  t r u e  f o r  S = A, B ,  I. Suppose $e & T($e ) ;  
TE T TE T 
show $e 5 TE($e .  . I . ,  . W e  know $e S E.( .$e . . . ) ,  s o  T ($e  ) S 
TE 
TE ($eTE) So $e g TE ($e  ) , which . i s . : s u f f  i c i e n t  t o  prove 
the!  lemma by induc t ion .  
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